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Ineffective implementation of strategy is one of organisations’ gravest problems because it leaves 
large parts of their strategies’ economic potential unrealised. Enquiring into strategy 
implementation problems in the context of their occurrence, i.e. in connection to the 
implementation processes within which they occur, and analysing the findings, the author aims to 
provide organisations with a tool to minimise strategy implementation problems by enabling 
organisational architects to build better strategy implementation processes. The assumption is 
that certain types of strategy content and implementation processes entail certain implementation 
problems. By anticipating these problems and pre-emptively building protective mechanisms into 
their strategy implementation process, companies can prepare for, or even prevent, said problems 
from occurring. 
This thesis is carried out as multiple case study of four mature, internationally active Finnish 
industrial companies. Eleven semi-structured interviews have been conducted with two to three 
participants per case company. The framework method has been used to analyse the results and to 
build, under consideration of the results from the literature review, a framework that describes the 
relationship between strategy content- and implementation process-type, and their effect on 
strategy implementation problems.   
In the findings, three relationships have been established; strategy content-type to 
implementation problems, strategy process-type to implementation problems, and strategy 
content-type to strategy implementation process-type. Intended strategies issued at a higher level 
of detail entail different implementation problems than those issued at a lower level of detail. 
More thoroughly defined and formalised implementation processes demonstrate different 
implementation problems than do less defined and formalised implementation processes. Hence, 
by applying the framework developed in this thesis’ cross-case analysis to their strategy content 
and process choice, organisations can predict the implementation problems they are likely to meet. 
Furthermore, the more distinctly strategic action is described in intended strategy, the more 
distinctly it is implemented. Hence, Mintzberg’s (1990) assertion that “structure follows strategy 
the way the left foot follows the right in walking” has once more been found to be true; the choice 
of strategy content already sets boundaries for the process choice, or, the choice of the strategy 
process already sets the boundaries for the strategy content choice.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Strategy implementation is a critical issue for most of today’s companies. This can be seen in 
the many studies on strategy implementation pitfalls and publications on strategy 
implementation improvement suggestions. According to Mankins and Steele (2005) 
companies realise a mere 63% of their strategies’ promised financial performance. Neilson, 
Martin and Powers (2008) point out that, by their own admission, the majority of companies 
is not very effective at translating strategy into actions. And Beer and Eisenstat (2000) write 
of the gap between “knowing what to do and actually doing it” (p.30). Academia and the 
business community agree on the importance of strategy implementation for an organisation’s 
sustainable success, as well as on the importance of the strategy implementation process for 
this success. Most of the publications covering strategy implementation pitfalls also include 
suggestions on how to improve said strategy implementation. Furthermore, when reaching out 
to companies for the purpose of writing this thesis, companies acknowledged the difficulty of 
strategy implementation and were interested more in a comparative, multiple case study 
design than an in-depth, single case study design. Hence, indicating their interest in exploring 
the benefits and drawbacks of other, different approaches.  
However, strategy implementation is not always the same in all companies; perceptions of the 
meaning of strategy, delimitations of what constitutes “strategy implementation” and 
understandings of organisational processes differ. Therefore, in order to start looking into 
strategy implementation, its process and problems, the topic needs to be defined in a more 
detailed manner first.  
 
1.1 THEORIES OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
After a first look at the literature on strategy implementation, its first problem is evident; the 
ambiguity of the term itself. This is no wonder, considering the already wide-ranging different 
interpretations of the term “strategy”. Thus, it is understandable that the definition of strategy 
implementation is ever so much more complicated. While strategic management scholars 
agree that strategy work consists of two interdependent phases, formation and 
implementation, there are difficulties in defining exactly what constitutes strategy formation 
and implementation. Mintzberg’s (1985) assertion that strategy formation and implementation 
occur simultaneously, and cannot easily be separated is widely accepted. However, when 
looking into his model of deliberate and emergent strategies it is also evident that they both 
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start from intended strategy. Thus, the starting point of strategy implementation is an initially 
communicated, intended strategy, a pre-conceived goal, or a set of “strategic objectives”, that 
all organisational members pursue (Li, Gouhui & Eppler, 2008). This makes the enactment of 
deliberate and emergent strategies part of the implementation process. Deliberate strategy is 
the implementation of the exact intentions of intended strategy. According to Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985), it is highly unlikely that strategy implementation is purely deliberate because 
this would require a flawless understanding of, and agreement with, intended strategy, as well 
as total control over external factors. Therefore, emergent strategy, the enactment of activities 
that were not initially meant by the intended strategy, occurs, formulating future strategy.  
Therefore, the structural context (Burgelman, 1983), i.e. the strategy implementation process 
within which induced strategic behaviour (the equivalent term to deliberate strategy) and 
autonomous strategic behaviour (the equivalent to emergent strategy), occur, is of great 
importance. This structural context defines the level of formality of the strategy 
implementation process and the level of corporate control exerted, both of which influence the 
extent to which emergent strategy is encouraged or suppressed. As can be expected, the 
different constellations of this structural context have a great impact onto how strategy is 
implemented, and presumably also on which kind of implementation problems they 
encounter.  
Strategy implementation processes are very diverse, but can be described with the help of a 
few indicators defining their main workings. These indicators are role ascription into strategy 
formulators and implementers for top, middle and operational management, as well as the 
sequencing of formation and implementation (Floyd & Lane, 2000) activities. Therefore, 
these indicators define who in the organisation carries out which tasks, and in which order, 
giving further indication on the balance of deliberate and emergent strategy in intended 
strategy implementation. Moreover, it is of relevance, whether strategy is considered to 
consist of all activities that make up the operational, ongoing business of an organisation or 
considered to consist of only selected strategic development items. This distinction defines the 
strategy implementation process as being either annual planning-driven (Quinn, 1980, 
Hussey, 1999; Hrebiniak, 2005) in the former case or initiative-driven (Killing, Malnight & 
Keys, 2005; Morgan, Levitt & Malek, 2007) in the latter.  
Thus, in order to define strategy implementation more clearly, certain assumptions about what 
an organisation considers to be strategy implementation need to be made; is there a clear 
ascription of “formulator” and “implementer” roles, is there a clear sequencing of the 
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“formation” and the “implementation” phases and is strategy the sum of an organisation’s 
activities or is it a set of selected strategic development items. All these factors describe 
whether an implementation process is considered to be annual planning- or initiative-driven. 
Furthermore, they give an understanding of the degree of formality and tightness of the 
structural context. The process through which deliberate and emergent strategies are enacted 
in the strategy implementation phase, and the assumptions this process makes about strategic 
content, goals, roles and sequencing, are of great interest because different understandings of 
strategy implementation lead to different tasks to be counted as strategy implementation and 
different challenges to be met. Treating strategy implementation as one global phenomenon 
without taking into account these specific assumptions about its implementation environment 
provides only a limited understanding of their true reasons and meaning.  
All the studies on strategy implementation pitfalls and their respective solutions assessed 
within this thesis’ literature review assume strategy implementation to be that of deliberate 
strategy. Moreover, they focus mainly on strategy implementation pitfalls, their symptoms 
and potential solutions, ignoring the structural environment within which they occur.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Now this thesis will take a closer look at strategy implementation problems in their 
organisational context, aiming to connect specific strategy implementation problems to the 
strategy implementation process they are occurring in. For this, the case companies’ strategy 
implementation processes need to be described.  
Research Question #1 “What do implementation processes look like?” 
Strategy implementation processes will be assessed for their balance of deliberate and 
emergent strategy, their rigidness and formality, as well as their understanding of the term 
“strategy”. Subsequently, they are going to be classified as either annual planning-driven or 
initiative-driven.  
As a next step, the case companies’ implementation problems need to be identified.  
Research Question #2 “What implementation problems do companies encounter?” 
The literature review will demonstrate that, in general, the different kinds of strategy 
implementation pitfalls are already well known and researched. However, they are usually 
approached by describing them and giving advice on how to fight or prevent them (Beer & 
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Eisenstat, 2000; Crittenden & Crittenden, 2008; Higgins, 2005; Martin, Neilson, & Powers 
2008). A factor rarely discussed is their organisational context, in particular the strategy 
implementation process as part of which they occur. This is the area onto which this thesis is 
going to focus its analysis.    
Research Question #3 “Are there particular process-problem matches?”  
Thus, the objective of this study is to build a theoretical framework that matches particular 
strategy implementation problems with the processes within which they occur. This 
framework will enable organisational architects to predict the implementation problems their 
organisation is likely to encounter.  
Further, the question whether some processes are inherently better than others will be treated.  
Research Question #4 “Are some strategy implementation processes better than others?”  
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This thesis is structured into eight chapters. From chapter 2, this thesis will start off with a 
literature review that is divided into three parts. First, it will provide a preliminary 
delimitation of how the strategy implementation sub-part of the strategy process can be 
defined, therewith addressing the ambiguity of the term “strategy implementation”. Then, it 
will go on to present and compare two distinct process approaches to strategy implementation; 
the annual planning- and the initiative-driven process. Third, a literature review of commonly 
found strategy implementation problems and solutions to these problems will be conducted. 
This will demonstrate that the strategy implementation process itself can be both, the cause 
and cure of strategy implementation problems. In chapter three, the thesis’ methodology is 
explained, before the author moves on to presenting the empirical findings and in-case 
analysis in chapter four. Each case company’s strategy content- and implementation process-
type will be assessed and their respective strengths and problems will be discussed. Following 
this, in chapter five, the author will conduct a cross-case analysis and build the resulting 
theory on the relationship between strategy content- and implementation process-type and 
their effect on strategy implementation problems. Finishing this thesis are chapter six with a 
discussion on its contributions to research, managerial application and suggestions for future 
research, chapter seven with references and chapter eight with appendices. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
This Master’s thesis follows a strategy process research approach to investigate the issue of 
strategy implementation. In order to delimit the notion of “strategy implementation”, the 
author will work towards a definition of the strategy implementation process. As part of this 
endeavour, the roles of deliberate and emergent strategy within strategy implementation will 
be discussed. Once this definition of strategy implementation has been established, various 
variables describing the process in more detail will be discussed. These variables are the roles 
of top, middle and operational management in strategy implementation, the sequencing of 
strategy formation and implementation within strategy implementation and the tightness and 
level of formalisation of the strategy implementation process.    
These concepts will then be applied to two different strategy implementation process types; 
the initiative-driven and the annual planning-driven strategy implementation process model. 
These process types will be illustrated in more detail by their framework, outlining their main 
workings, and will then be discussed at the aid of the previously developed theory.  
The chapter will end with the third part in which numerous studies on implementation pitfalls 
and potential solutions are discussed, and the role of the strategy implementation process as a 
potential solution is presented.  
 
2.1 STRATEGY PROCESS RESEARCH AND THE ROLE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Strategy as a term that initially has its roots in warfare and military use has slowly, but 
decisively crept its way into business life and, by today, has taken a strong stand in companies 
and business schools. But the term is large and research on the topic covers so many different 
areas that every professional, academic and layman has their own definition of what exactly 
strategy is, how far the concept spans and which managerial tasks it includes. To address the 
issue of the missing definition of strategic management, Nag, Hambrick and Chen (2007:942) 
have conducted a study to assess how scholars and the academic community define the field 
and have found a definition that, despite being rather large, seems to capture the consensus:    
“The field of strategic management deals with (a) the major intended and emergent 
initiatives (b) taken by general managers on behalf of owners, (c) involving 
utilization of resources (d) to enhance the performance (e) of firms (f) in their 
external environments.” 
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This definition still leaves much room for interpretation and many practitioners and 
academics have more selective perceptions, picking parts of this definition while excluding 
others. However, due to its inclusive nature it captures the general understanding of the field. 
In this part of the chapter, the author will delimit the area of strategy research relevant to her 
work and provide a summary of the current stand of the literature, which serves as the base of 
this thesis.  
 
 
2.1.1 AREAS OF STRATEGY RESEARCH 
Doz and Chakravarthy (1992) divide strategy research into two subfields of strategy research; 
content research focusing “exclusively on what strategic positions of the firm lead to optimal 
performance under varying environmental contexts” (p.6), i.e. normative directives and 
methods for strategy formulation, and process research “concerned with how a firm's 
administrative systems and decision processes influence its strategic positions” (p.6), i.e. how 
strategy work is organised within an organisation. They view these two subfields both as 
serving firm performance improvement, but each one approaching the issue from a different 
angle. A third prominent subfield of strategy research is strategy-as-a-practice, a perspective 
“that considers strategy not as something that a firm has but rather as something that people 
do (Johnson, Melin & Whittington, 2003; Johnson et al., 2007)” (Rouleau, 2013:548), i.e. 
how is strategy work lived inside organisations. Generally, the content research side excludes 
implementation issues and tends to take a strong top-down, purely content-focused stand on 
strategy, as can be seen in the attitudes of some of the earliest and best known strategy 
academics: 
“Strategy is a course of action consciously deliberated by top management (e.g. 
Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1971) or an analytical exercise undertaken by staff 
strategists (e.g. Ansoff, 1965, Porter, 1980)” (Bower & Noda, 1996:159)  
This content string is the most straight-forward, most known, commonly taught and oldest 
one of the three. Process and practice research, however, also include the implementation 
issue as one part of strategy work. As this thesis will look into strategy implementation, and 
more precisely at the processes through which strategies are implemented and the problems in 
implementation related to the choice of process, this thesis will adopt a process research view.  
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2.1.2 STRATEGY SHAPES STRUCTURE 
For implementation, organisational structures are important because these dictate how an 
organisation functions. One of the earliest approaches to analyse the role of structure and its 
relationship to strategy has been made in 1962 by Chandler. Chandler (1962) discovered that 
strategy and structure of a company are closely linked and found that, generally, “structure 
follows strategy” (p.14). According to Chandler (1962:14), structure has two aspects: 
“The lines of authority and communication between the different administrative 
offices and officers and, second, the information and data that flow through these 
lines of communication and authority” 
In this logic, structure describes both, the organisation of individuals into roles and hierarchies 
and the administrative mechanisms through which they are acting and interacting. According 
to his theory, an organisation first makes choices about their strategy and then creates 
structures that support this strategy’s implementation. In this view, any organisational 
structure is always the result of the organisation’s previously chosen strategy. In his research, 
Chandler showed that as organisations grow and adopt new strategies, they require ever more 
complex organisational structures. Structure in his research refers to the organisational design 
that goes from the simple, one-divisional to a multi-divisional and matrix organisational form. 
Thus, an organisational structure evolves with a firm’s growth strategies’ development; 
organisations pass through ever more complicated evolving phases as their single strategies 
multiply and require new structures to deal with the newly arising issues of increasing 
complexity. In general, the smaller and younger a company is, the less sophisticated its 
structures remain but as the company grows, its structures gain in sophistication and 
complexity. A feature not covered in Chandler’s work, but nonetheless applicable to his 
research is the situation of companies after a turnaround – as they refocus their operations and 
meet lower turnover figures, structures are reversed, i.e. limited.  
Chandler’s study was largely taken up by other scholars who, under the given presumption 
that strategy shapes structure, widened the scope to include a larger definition of “structure“. 
However, following Chandler’s definition of structure, it is the cornerstone for 
implementation in any organisation as it designates how the company itself internally works.  
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2.1.3 STRUCTURE ALSO SHAPES STRATEGY 
However, there have been challenging views evolving that question this common 
understanding that strategy always precedes structure. Some of the earliest researchers for this 
are Hall and Saias (1985) who contended that in fact, often, “strategy follows structure” 
(p.149). According to them, an organisation can set its structure only initially, but once it is 
set, the organisation’s future strategic choices are limited by this initial structure choice. They 
justify this argument partly by Chandler’s (1962) own admission that “structure often failed to 
follow strategy. In each of the four companies, there was a time lag between the appearance 
of the administrative needs and their satisfaction” (p. 315) and partly by their findings on the 
shortcomings of centralised structures. Centralised planning assigned solely to the top 
management or an assigned group of specialists causes a loss of the field-workers market 
environment knowledge and centralised bureaucratic structures modify the organisation 
members’ perception of strategic issues. Whether an organisation is structured centralised or 
decentralised, hierarchical or non-hierarchical will influence their decisions on all business 
matters from growth to make-or-buy and portfolio decisions. Thus, the organisation’s set 
structures define future strategic decisions.  
 
 
2.1.4 DELIBERATE AND EMERGENT STRATEGY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS 
The understanding that best captures this thesis’ take on this question is that of Henry 
Mintzberg who synthesised these opposing views to a more balanced, more integrated view. 
According to Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998) “structure follows strategy the way the 
left foot follows the right in walking” (p.35). This view recognises both the intentional effect 
of strategy on structure and the more unintentional effect of structure on strategy. More 
importantly yet, it lays the groundwork for Mintzberg’s theory of deliberate and emergent 
strategies – the source for the idea that strategies can be made and implemented both bottom-
up (i.e. emergent) and top-down (i.e. deliberate) at the same time.  Intended top-down strategy 
is implemented through an organisation’s implementation process (i.e. an organisation’s 
structure), where it is shaped by deliberate and emergent strategy to become the realised 
strategy.  
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Figure 1: Mintzberg & Waters (1985) 
According to Mintzberg and Waters (1985), perfectly deliberate strategies must occur under 
three conditions; firstly, the organisational intentions must have been explained in great detail, 
secondly, they must be either shared by everyone in the organisation or accepted as given 
from the management, i.e. is no internal opposition or influences, and, thirdly, there cannot be 
any external forces influencing on their execution, i.e. the organisation must have had full 
control over their environment or exact foresight over market developments. If all these 
conditions are met, the originally intended strategy, i.e. the deliberate strategy, is realised. 
Yet, in reality, this never happens. In purely emergent strategy, there is order, or “consistency 
in action over time” (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985:258), without any intention. This occurs as 
rarely as purely deliberate strategy. As a result, what happens is that the realised strategy is a 
result of intended deliberate strategy and emergent strategy. Mintzberg et al. (1998) introduce 
ten different kinds of strategies along this continuum of deliberate and emergent strategies. 
One of them is the “design school”, where a strong planning culture exists and the role of 
deliberate strategy is very strong. Another one is the “learning school”, where emergent 
strategy is strong as logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1980) causes formulation and 
implementation to intertwine. For this “learning school”, they propose the use of “process 
strategy” (Mintzberg et al., 1998) through which an organisation aims to control the parts of 
strategy making it can rather easily control – the people and processes through which 
strategies are generated. While the organisation designs the process through which strategy 
work is done, i.e. organisational structures and hiring of the “right” employees into the fitting 
positions, it leaves the content creation to the actual actors. Hence, in this case there is a 
greater importance on emergent strategy, allowing for deliberate and emergent behaviour to 
occur at the same time.  
Applying Mintzberg and Water’s (1985) concept to strategy implementation, this “process 
strategy” approach can be extended to shape not only strategy generation, but also its 
implementation. Structures and processes for strategy implementation are developed in order 
to provide a strategy implementation process that is set by the leadership of an organisation 
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according to their intentions and with the objective to facilitate the implementation of 
deliberate strategies, but within which actors are free to implement also emergent strategies. It 
recognises that an organisation can’t control everything and aims to make the best out of this. 
However, when devising the process, the organisation needs to make sure its strategic 
intentions are well understood in the organisation and that complimentary structures support 
these. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) are aware of this problem as they stated “Identifying 
intentions is a tricky business in any context. Who can be sure that what was articulated was 
truly intended” (p.265).  
These findings lay the groundwork and base assumptions for this thesis.  They show that 
while there is always one part that can be actively steered by formulated, intended strategy, 
strategy is not purely deliberate and there usually is also emergent strategy, actions that 
happen without intentionally having been planned. Both of these parts occur during the 
implementation process; the formulated, intended strategy needs to be implemented, but while 
it is being implemented it might change as a result of decisions taken by implementers in the 
course of implementation. In this light, small implementation decisions might be considered 
future strategy formation elements. This goes to show that strategy formation and 
implementation are not easily separable but are indeed, as Mintzberg and Waters (1995) state, 
intertwined. Thus, the process through which a formulated, intended strategy becomes a 
realised strategy decides how closely the realised strategy resembles the initially formulated 
intended strategy. 
 
2.1.5 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF THE “IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS” 
Now, in order to assess more thoroughly the implications this has on strategy implementation, 
some general assumptions about what strategy formation and implementation are need to be 
discussed; what is understood by these two phases, what do they contain, in which order do 
they occur and where in the organisation are they executed? A review of the current state of 
strategy implementation literature conducted by Li et al. (2008), published as working paper 
in 2008, assessed 60 articles from a selection of renowned, peer-reviewed journals on the 
definition of strategy implementation and its current stand of research. From this, they were 
able to define  
“strategy implementation as a dynamic, iterative and complex process, which is 
comprised of a series of decisions and activities by managers and employees – 
affected by a number of interrelated internal and external factors – to turn 
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strategic plans into reality in order to achieve strategic objectives.” (Li et al., 
2008:6) 
Analysing this definition by its parts, six defining features are apparent;  
1. a “dynamic, iterative and complex process” describes that it is a continuous interaction 
on multiple organisational levels. The term “iterative” highlights the existence of 
emergent strategy, i.e. the existence of strategy formation throughout the strategy 
implementation phase. 
2. “Comprised of decisions”, i.e. on how the formulated strategy is implemented and 
how the future strategy will be influenced by decisions taken during the 
implementation of intended strategy  
3. “and activities by managers and employees”, i.e. implementation is done on all levels. 
Further, these activities are the “means” by which strategic ends are to be reached.  
4. “Affected by internal and external factors”, where internal factors include social 
constructs and the processes governing strategy implementation. 
5. “to turn strategic plans into reality” implies that implementation starts from formulated 
strategy, a pre-conceived goal, i.e. is there is an initial distinction between 
implementation and formation. However, it does not exclude that the fact that future 
strategic plans might be influenced (formulated) by the implementation of previous 
strategic plans. Strategic plans may be interpreted here as strategic content, rather than 
detailed plans.  
6. “in order to achieve strategic objectives”, these are the ends towards which a strategy 
is directed.  
According to this, an attempt to define what constitutes formation and implementation can be 
made. Strategy work is often distinguished into strategic thinking and strategic planning 
(Moore, 2009). According to Moore (2009), strategic thinking aims to define the ends, the 
future intended state of the organisation – equal to the concept of formation – and “this 
happens first” (p.4), then comes strategic planning – corresponding to the concept of 
implementation – which “determines the most effective means to achieve those ends” (p.4). 
This is mirrored in definition parts #3 and #6 where managers and employees are carrying out 
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activities (means) to achieve the objectives (ends) set in the strategy. Moore further states that 
the outcome of the board’s strategic thinking process represents the starting point for the 
management’s strategic planning process. There is thus a clear distinction between roles 
where each part happens, formation and implementation, and the order in which they occur. 
This is mirrored in definition part #5, stating that implementation is always initially preceded 
by formation. 
However, definition part #2 also includes decisions on the same level as actions as integral 
part of strategy implementation. Often, strategic decisions are taken as part of strategy 
implementation and in the future become the declared, intended strategy. Therefore, the 
strategic planning process, i.e. implementation, in itself might become part of strategy 
formation. Thus, in order to define strategy implementation, the nature of decisions taken 
during the implementation process is of interest. Shivakumar (2014) proposes a model that 
distinguishes decisions made within an organisation by two dimensions, their impact on the 
organisation’s scope and commitment, in a 2x2 matrix; Strategic decisions (significant 
changes in both commitment and scope), neo-strategic (significant changes in scope but not 
commitment), tactical (significant change in commitment but not scope) and operational (no 
significant changes in scope nor 
commitment). While strategic, tactical and 
operational decisions have been known in 
the field for some time now, neo-strategic 
decisions are a new concept resulting from 
the increased speed of the business 
environment (Shivakumar, 2014). This 
classification of decisions is interesting to 
the concept of strategy implementation 
because not all decisions taken as part of the 
implementation of deliberate strategy also represent emergent strategy – but some of them do. 
Therefore, while definition part #5 states that implementation is preceded by formation, this 
does not exclude the possibilities that implementation precedes formation if strategic or neo-
strategic decisions are taken.    
Thus, in implementation processes there are three important determinants; the order in which 
formation and implementation occur, that initially implementation starts from formation of 
intended strategy (definition part #5), the strategic importance of decisions subsequently made 
    Figure 2: Shivakumar (2014), p.87 
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(definition part #2), qualifying them as either formation or implementation in the course of 
implementation, and at which level in the organisation an activity or decision is carried out 
(definition parts #1 and #3), assigning roles to different hierarchical levels.  
 
 
2.1.6 ROLES AND SEQUENCING AS INDICATORS FOR THE BALANCE 
BETWEEN DELIBERATE AND EMERGENT STRATEGY IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
This is also addressed in the framework developed by Floyd and Lane (2000) assessing role 
conflicts between different organisational actors in strategic renewal. They have defined three 
subprocesses; competence definition (promotion of innovation throughout the organisation), 
competence modification (recognition of the need for change) and competence deployment 
(management of operations). In each subprocess, actors on different levels of the organisation 
have different time horizons, information requirements and core values influencing their roles, 
which sometimes bring them in conflict with each other. The two subprocesses of interest for 
the strategy implementation process are competence definition and competence employment. 
As part of the competence definition subprocess, there is great potential for strategic and neo-
strategic decisions on all organisational levels, thus strategies are more emergent than 
deliberate; they are driven from within the organisation, bottom-up through employee 
participation. In this subprocess, strategy implementation co-occurs with or precedes strategy 
formation. There is no clear sequencing or role ascription. As part of the competence 
deployment subprocess there is less potential for strategic or neo-strategic decisions, but 
tactical and operational decisions are more frequent. Here, operationalisation of day-to-day 
business takes precedence. Thus, there is a clear sequencing of strategy formation preceding 
strategy implementation. Moreover, there is a clear role ascription of top management 
formulating strategy and top, middle and operative management to implement.   
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Figure 3: Floyd & Lane (2000); Managerial Roles, Information Exchange and the Strategic Renewal 
Subprocesses 
 
From this it stands to reason that the level of detail with which a company’s strategy 
formation process formulates and communicates its intended strategy – as high-level vision, 
clear set of initiatives or clear set operational instructions – as well as how strictly its process 
aims to operationalise this strategy has a strong influence on how much strategy formation 
occurs within the strategy implementation phase.  
According to this model, both strategy formation and implementation occur at all levels – a 
view that is in line with the literature discussed so far. However, it also clearly shows that 
there are different degrees to which the different organisational levels carry out both roles.  
Top management ratifies (formulates and implements) and directs (formulates and 
implements), middle management champions (formulates) and implements (implements), and 
operating management experiments (formulates through implementation) and conforms 
(implements). 
 
  
Recognise need 
for change 
Resource allocation  
to regular operations 
Promote  
Innovation 
 15 
 
  Competence Definement Competence Deployment 
Top Management  “Ratifying” “Directing” 
 Role Formulating & Implementing Formulating & Implementing 
 Decisions Strategic & Neo-Strategic Strategic & Neo-Strategic 
 Sequencing Formation   Implementation Formation  Implementation 
Middle Management  “Championing” “Implementing” 
 Role Formulate Implementing 
 Decisions Strategic, Neo-Strategic                     
& Tactical 
Tactical & Operational 
 Sequencing Formation  Implementation Formation  Implementation 
Operating Management  “Experimenting” “Conforming” 
 Role Implementing & Formulating Implementing 
 Decisions Strategic, Neo-Strategic,            
Tactical & Operational 
Tactical & Operational 
 Sequencing Formation  Implementation Formation  Implementation 
Table 1: Competence Definement and Competence Deployment with Roles, Decisions, Sequencing 
 
The question whether an activity in strategy implementation is of formulating or 
implementing nature can be answered by the decisions taken as part of this activity; if it is 
strategic or neo-strategic it will have an influence on the firm’s scope, hence it is a 
formulating activity. In turn, if the decisions taken are tactical or operational, their 
corresponding activity can be classified as implementing. The order of an activity can be 
classified as either being in response to or inducing intended strategy, or as formation and 
implementation occurring simultaneously. In table 1, competence definement corresponds to 
Mintzberg’s emergent strategy, i.e. strategy formation as part of implementation, and 
competence deployment corresponds to Mintzberg’s deliberate strategy, i.e. the purely 
deliberate strategy.  
The internal process during which this interaction between strategy formation and 
implementation is managed will influence its outcome. Therefore, it becomes of vital 
importance for companies “how to organise a firm’s strategic planning process in a systematic 
way to create an appropriately balanced approach to strategic planning that yields the 
flexibility of an emergent process with the discipline of a deliberate process.” (Dibrell, Down 
& Bull, 2007:23). A theoretical description of this process (definition part #1, from Li et al., 
2008) is best given by the Bower-Burgelman process-model.  
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2.1.7 INTEGRATION OF DELIBERATE AND EMERGENT STRATEGIES:  
THE BOWER-BURGELMAN PROCESS MODEL 
The Bower-Burgelman process model suggests that strategy implementation is organised 
through intertwined interactions between formation and implementation of strategy on 
multiple organisational levels. This interaction needs to be organised in every organisation 
through a strategy implementation process that balances the effects of an organisation’s 
strategic context and its structural context. Burgelman (1983:61) captures this by stating:  
“Most strategic activities are induced by the firm’s current concept of corporate 
strategy, but also emerging are some autonomous strategic activities, that is, 
activities that fall outside the scope of the current concept of strategy”.  
The model adopts Mintzberg’s (1998) strategy “process school” where strategy is formed 
emergently through decisions and actions, and where ad-hoc, flexible decision and strategy-
making happens through processes that are designed to achieve intended strategy. Figure 4 
describes the model; the concept of corporate strategy is at the beginning. It sets the starting 
point and based on the current concept of corporate strategy induced strategic behaviour (1) 
and the structural context (2) are set. Structural context refers to the “administrative 
mechanisms that corporate management can manipulate the” (Burgelman, 1983:65) behaviour 
of organisational members with, hence it includes the formal strategy implementation process. 
The structural context and current concept of corporate strategy influence the type of 
proposals made (3) and accepted (4). Induced strategic behaviour covers mostly activities that 
are consistent with the existing business – it does not aim to change the organisation’s scope 
but pursues deliberate strategy. Autonomous strategic behaviour, in turn, is not planned but 
results from engaged employees driving their own ideas for change – it aims to expand the 
organisation’s current scope. Strategic context refers to middle managers’ linking of 
autonomous actions to corporate strategy. In this function, it acts as connecting point between 
the autonomous strategic behaviour (5) and the concept of corporate strategy (8), and as such 
takes an important influence on the development of the future concept of corporate strategy. 
To some extent, the strategic context, i.e. how middle management will react to autonomous 
strategic behaviour, shapes also strategic behaviour (7). Employees anticipate middle 
management’s reaction to their proposals and this influences the type of proposals they make. 
Structural context takes a limited influence on the strategic context (6), as middle managers’ 
reaction to autonomous strategic behaviour may be influenced by the structural constraints 
they experience.  
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Figure 4: Bower-Burgelman process model (1983) 
 
From the study conducted by Noda and Bower (1996) three propositions of relevance to 
strategy implementation processes are known. Firstly, top management has a strong influence 
on the development of bottom-up initiatives through the establishment of context within 
which managers take decisions. Secondly, the structural and strategic context, both take 
influence. Of particular interest here is Noda and Bower’s (1996) findings that the structural 
context is so strong that this often creates problems to the very same top managers who 
initially set the structural context – this highlights the need to consider beforehand what the 
structural context should look like before instating it. Thirdly, the structural context is stable 
over time and thus tends to make it difficult for companies to change the way in which they 
work. Hence, the structural context can act as strong inhibitor for change and flexibility. In 
addition to representing the processes within a company, it also represents routines and the 
collective behaviour pattern of its members. These are strong social constructs, often difficult 
to modify.  
 
Relating this model to the literature discussed previously, it confirms the importance of the 
structural context; the structural context standing for the strategy implementation process. The 
attempt to implement intended strategy, i.e. formulated strategy or, here, the concept of 
corporate strategy, triggers induced strategic behaviour (i.e. deliberate strategy), while the 
chosen formal process to implement this strategy represents a part of the structural context 
and also influences the induced strategic behaviour. Therefore, the formal strategy 
implementation process, i.e. the structural context here, may affect on the strategic context as 
inhibitor or promoter of autonomous strategic behaviour. The autonomous strategic behaviour 
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here is comparable to Mintzberg and Water’s (1985) emerging strategy. As such, the chosen 
formal strategy implementation process is a relevant intermediary to strategy implementation; 
it needs to balance induced and autonomous strategic behaviour. While also the induced 
strategic behaviour may be partly emergent strategy due to the potential non-fulfilment of the 
three premises for perfectly deliberate strategy, autonomous strategic behaviour represents the 
larger part of the emergent strategy because induced strategic behaviour has actively and 
intentionally been triggered by the intended strategy, autonomous strategic behaviour has not 
been consciously triggered and only appears through its implementation.  
 
Figure 5: Modified version of Floyd & Lane (2000) 
 
The intentional, induced part of strategy implementation of this model corresponds to Floyd 
and Lane’s (2000) competence deployment subprocess, while the unintentional, autonomous 
part of strategy implementation corresponds to Floyd and Lane’s (2000) competence 
definition subprocess. The balance with which a strategy implementation process enables or 
suppresses these two sub-elements has a strong influence on how aligned a company’s 
strategy implementation is.   
                   Implementation
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2.1.8 FORMALISATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS THROUGH STRATEGIC PLANNING 
While some academics say that the strategy process cannot be formalised, others agree that 
formalising the strategy implementation process furthers strategies’ successful completion. To 
put it in Mintzberg’s (1994a) words, “Planning cannot generate strategies. But given viable 
strategies, it can program them; it can make them operational” (p.112). This quote captures 
the difference between formulating strategy and implementing it – strategic planning only 
serves a strategy’s implementation, not its formulation. However, any formalisation, or 
planning, of strategy implementation, while making strategy operational, takes away a certain 
level of strategic flexibility and organisational renewal. The more a process is formalised – or 
in other words, the stronger the structural context – the more this is the case. Settling on some 
objectives, tasks and budgets over others may inhibit the development into a different 
direction. Thus, expressing strategy through precise figures, time-lines and schedules in the 
form of annual plans or the like places it in an analytical setting, disconnecting it from its 
synthetical nature (Moore, 2009 on Mintzberg, 1987). As such, planning, strategic and other, 
can only occur as part of a strategy’s implementation, not its formation – making strategic 
planning clearly implementation of deliberate strategy. The decisions taken within the this 
planning process are tactical or operational, following (neo-)strategic objectives set prior to 
the planning of their implementation. However, during this same process of implementing 
deliberate strategy, i.e. operationalization by means of (strategic) planning, other strategic 
issues may arise and (neo-)strategic decisions may be taken, rendering part of the planning 
process also emergent strategy, i.e. formation. It is, therefore, of interest to take a look at 
different implementation modes, to assess their respective level of freedom to integrate also 
(neo-) strategic decisions in this planning of deliberate strategy, as well as the their ease to 
allow emergent strategy in general within the implementation. 
Strategy implementation always balances two simultaneous subprocesses, the implementation 
of deliberate strategies through induced behaviour in the structural context and the 
implementation of emergent strategies through autonomous behaviour in the strategic context. 
The organisational design needs to recognise this challenge and design the formal strategy 
implementation process in a way that facilitates both subprocesses. In order to make room for 
both subprocesses to occur simultaneously, the formal strategy implementation process needs 
to be tight and formalised enough for strategic planning to occur, while at the same time 
allowing flexpoints (Dibrell et al., 2007) to facilitate the integration of emergent strategies. 
The extent to which bottom-up strategies, which might deviate from intended goals, are 
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encouraged needs to be decided when choosing the formal strategy implementation model. 
The organisational architect needs to be aware of their willingness to encourage or allow 
autonomous strategic behaviour and, consequently, needs to make a choice between the level 
of formalisation, i.e. efficiency and repetitiveness of actions, and the level of freedom, i.e. 
room for innovation and employee-driven change, incorporated in the organisation’s 
implementation process. As Dibrell, Craig and Neubaum (2014) point out, this choice 
between formalisation and freedom is a tricky one; too formal processes might tell employees 
exactly what is expected and decrease task uncertainty, but at the same time it might reduce 
innovativeness and flexibility to react to environmental changes. Hence, the choice between 
formalisation and freedom of the process will ultimately influence how closely the realised 
strategy in the end resembles the original intended strategy. 
 
 
2.2 STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS DESIGN 
When it comes to the operationalisation of strategies, there are three commonly found 
approaches; the annual planning process done in most organisations, the initiative-driven and 
the informal process. The first two represent a continuum; while some companies may 
operationalise their strategy mostly through the annual planning as part of their operations 
planning, others may opt to exclude strategy implementation from their daily operations and 
instate a separate process, and yet others may opt for a way in between. The third option 
would be that strategies are implemented outside of any formal process, purely emergent and 
dependent on individuals’ initiative.  
Looking at particular strategy implementation models to illustrate these types, there is of 
course a myriad of process models available, reflecting the issue’s apparent relevance for 
business. This relevance is also reflected in the high degree of practitioner-oriented articles 
and books published for an executive audience. The author has chosen two models to discuss 
in this literature review – one for the initiative-driven and one for the annual planning-driven 
model. The first model, the strategy execution framework by Morgen et al. (2007), represents 
the initiative-driven approach. It has not been published in academic journals. The second 
one, the strategy execution model by Hrebiniak (2005), represents the annual planning-driven 
approach and has been published in both, academic journals and for practitioners. The 
informal process is very uncommon in mature companies – see Chandler’s (1962) logic of 
structural development with age – and will thus not be discussed.  
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2.2.1 THE INITIATIVE-DRIVEN PROCESS: 
STRATEGIC EXECUTION FRAMEWORK® 
(SEF) BY MORGAN, LEVITT & MALEK 
Initiative-driven strategy implementation processes are usually designed to address change. 
As displayed by Killing et al., (2005) must-win battle concept, a framework falling into this 
category, the initiative-driven process-type starts from an assessment of the current situation 
and compares this to the desired situation. It then goes on to identify the key challenges that 
need to be mastered to get there, in this case the must-win battles. This process is said to 
occur at the top management level, making strategy formation the first step, governed top-
down. However, insights from lower down in the organisation are encouraged to be 
communicated and discussed beforehand. Hence, there is also a clear allocation of roles; top 
management formulates strategy, all layers implement. These must-win battles represent the 
currently most urgent issues to be addressed and changed. As the authors state, they are the 
most important three to five issues and for each one “you will need to concentrate all your 
resources, and all management’s attention, on your chosen MWBs” (Killing et al., 2005:3). 
Furthermore, they are tangible and implementable, not wide concepts. Once decided and 
communicated, these must-win battles are implemented through action plans. Action plans are 
embedding these particular, often from the operational activities detached, must-win battles 
into the organisation’s operational agenda. Therefore, it follows that implementation pursues 
goals set within the must-win battles – formation precedes implementation. Further, the 
integration into the operative agenda implies mainly tactical and operational decisions. The 
induced strategic behaviour is hence stronger than autonomous strategic behaviour, making 
deliberate strategy the prevalent force. Within their action plans, the must-win battles are 
followed up regularly. Other theoretical concepts regroup these action plans into initiatives 
under particular must-win battles, while yet others just refer to the concept of “must-win 
battles” by the name of “initiatives”. In all cases, however, initiatives, or must-win battles, are 
changing over time, making this an ongoing process addressing always the most urgent needs 
for change.  
A more inclusive version of this must-win battle, or initiative, concept is displayed by the 
framework for strategy implementation that has been developed as university-industry 
partnership in cooperation between IPSolutions (IPS) and the Stanford Centre for Professional 
Development (SCPD). This partnership started in 1999 with the creation of the Stanford 
Advanced Project Management Program (SAPM), an executive education program in 
advanced project management. The SEF® has been developed as part of the SAPM and 
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constitutes a major part of the program curriculum. As this already indicates, it takes a very 
project management-like approach to implementing strategy – converting a strategy into a 
portfolio of programs and projects, implemented in an organisation’s operations.  
This model also sees a clear distinction between strategy formation and implementation, 
where the former ultimately precedes the latter. Accordingly, this model also recognises a 
definite divide into formulators and implementers, something shown in the authors’ 
characterisation of one the largest problems in strategy implementation: 
“This language barrier prevents many senior executives from communicating 
effectively with the people who will actually bring the strategy to life. 
Executives speak of strategic outcomes rather than specific project outputs, and too 
often they fail to link the two. The converse is also true: project and program 
managers rarely have the opportunity or inclination to think about the strategic 
implications of their work.”(Morgan et al., 2007:8) 
In this short passage of the book three important points are made, all typical of initiative-
driven strategy implementation models; first, a clear division of roles in and order of strategy 
formation and implementation is made, and strategy here is seen as purely deliberate. Second, 
they, i.e. the executives, are not actively implementing the strategy but are the sole 
responsible instance for linking their goals, i.e. strategic outcomes, to the implementers’ 
goals, i.e. project outcomes. There is cascading 
of goals from the corporate to the individual 
target-level. Third, it is just assumed that 
implementers are not interested in the strategic 
implications of their work (Morgan et al., 
2007), hence, it is assumed operating and 
middle managers usually have no intent, nor 
are they encouraged to drive strategy. Thus, 
emerging strategy is assumed to be limited.  
Moreover, the disconnect between strategy 
formation and implementation is evident when 
looking at the categorisation the authors make; 
they declare the Ideation, Nature and Vision 
domains as strategy formulation and the 
Synthesis and Transition domains as strategy execution – further highlighting the deliberate 
aspect of strategy implementation.  
Figure 6: Strategic Execution Framework® (2007) 
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The model does not require a step-by-step run-through of each domain, instead it recognises 
the need to align them. In consequence, the authors argue that an organisation can improve its 
strategy implementation process by a simple “tweaking” (Morgan et al., 2007:18) of the one 
or two domains where it is necessary. The model itself has an appealing logic, because it is 
quite straight-forward: 
“Ideation: Clarify and communicate identity, purpose and long-range intention 
 Nature: Align the organisation’s strategy, culture and structure 
 Vision: Translate long-range intention into clear goals, metrics and strategy 
 Engagement: Engage the strategy via the project investment stream 
 Synthesis: Monitor and continuously align the project work with strategy 
Transition: Transfer projects crisply to operations to reap the benefits”  
(Morgan et al., 2007:17) 
Its inclusive nature covers all the steps of an initiative-driven implementation model needed 
for implementing; from the identification of the current situation and the future intended state, 
the gap between the two (Ideation) and the precise strategy, including implementable goals 
and their metrics (Vision) to its match with the organisation’s culture (Nature). It covers the 
translation of this vision (Engagement) into precise, actionable initiatives, i.e. projects and 
programs (Synthesis), where programs signify a grouping of interdependent projects sharing 
resources, and it doesn’t exclude the crucial step of integrating the projects into operations 
(Transition). However, the authors argue that the engagement domain distinguishes one 
organisation’s strategic execution success from other organisations’ because it “is the 
discipline of engaging the strategy with the tailored portfolio of projects and programs that 
will bring it (the strategy) to life”  (Morgan et al., 2007:141). Zooming in on the 
implementation domains, the Engagement domain allocates resources to the chosen programs. 
This allocation represents an ongoing process of project portfolio management during which 
neo-strategic or strategic decision are made. It is recommended to happen through an 
engagement between strategy makers and project portfolio managers, formulators and 
implementers. Hence, in this instance it is a question of doing things right and executives (i.e. 
here strategy makers) still have the final say to decide. To each project and program a senior-
executive sponsor is assigned to provide vision, commitment and management help in form of 
scope, schedule and resource allocation. In addition this sponsor is also the ultimate decision-
making power, thereby enabling fast decisions when needed, even in difficult situations. In 
this light, the Engagement domain is the structural context; top-down managed projects and 
programs are induced strategic behaviour, projects and programs created in conformity to 
deliberate strategy. Nonetheless, the engagement domain also acts as strategic context as 
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autonomous strategic behaviour might bring projects or programs to life that are not conform 
to the deliberate strategy. For the latter, this engagement domain acts as gatekeeper. In the 
following domains of Synthesis and Transition it becomes a question of doing things right, 
and the decisions taken become ever more tactical and operational. Most of the behaviour is 
likely to be induced, but some autonomous strategic behaviour might nevertheless occur.  
The strategic execution framework is one of the few models that take a full organisational 
view and that make the connection between the strategy formulation and implementation 
stages. The engagement domain is designated to play a pivotal role in connecting “strategic 
outcomes” with “project outcomes”. Furthermore, it recognises that strategic content needs to 
be aligned to corporate identity and values, but at the same time be implementable. This is 
shown for example in the quite high-level phase of “vision” where the model points out the 
need for metrics, indicating a strong drive for operationalisation. It is suitable for this thesis 
because of its focus of translating formulated, deliberate strategy into a portfolio of programs 
and projects, i.e. concrete actions matched to the chosen strategy. Yet, the strong “project 
management” character displayed by this model is also its point for improvement; other 
aspects of implementing strategy are not referred to. The initiative focus is strong and 
strategies that are difficult to implement through projects or programs, or are not geared 
towards a somewhat drastic change might not be easily integrateable. According to this 
model, strategy needs to be ultimately implemented through programs or projects. These 
programs and projects need to be in line with the pre-conceived strategy, which might limit 
the scope of its applications.  
 
 
2.2.2 THE ANNUAL PLANNING-DRIVEN PROCESS: 
“MAKING STRATEGY WORK” BY HREBINIAK 
Strategy implementation processes driven by the annual planning cycle tend to address the 
implementation of strategies aiming to perform better, but within their status quo. According 
to Quinn (1980) annual planning rarely produces disruptive changes, but is focused more on 
gradually developing the business through “conscious managerial thought” (Mintzberg, 
1994b:108). This logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1978) philosophy concentrates more on 
continuous operational activities. Hussey (1999:270) states that the planning process  
“clearly shows not only what analytical steps are needed and what plans will 
result, but how the organisation will tackle this task and which organisational 
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units will be involved (…) Within the process provision must be made for formal 
reviews of the plan, and the dissemination and formal discussion of the strategic 
guidelines which enable operating divisions to make their plan”  
This shows the process’ continuous nature as well as its presumption that strategy formation 
and implementation occur simultaneously. Instead of providing a number of clear, tangible 
and implementable items of formulated strategy, different parts of the organisation pursue a 
sub-area of the whole organisation’s “strategic guidelines”. There is a clear division where in 
the organisation which decisions are taken. As part of their plan, divisions make (neo-) 
strategic as well as tactical and operational decisions. This makes strategy formation 
something that occurs not only on top management level, but also on middle manager or even 
operational manager level through implementation. Quinn’s (1978) incrementalism view 
describes this as “strategic subsystems, each of which attacks a specific class of strategic 
issues (e.g. acquisitions, divestures, or major reorganisations) in a disciplined way, but which 
is blended incrementally and opportunistically into a cohesive pattern that becomes the 
corporate strategy”
 
(p.8), through the (multi-) annual planning process. 
 
One model for strategy implementation through the annual planning system, or operational 
planning in general, is Lawrence Hrebiniak’s “Making Strategy Work” (2005). Lawrence 
Hrebiniak is a professor at Wharton Business School, at the University of Pennsylvania. His 
model is based on his research of strategy implementation and his experience as consultant 
and as director of the Wharton executive program in strategy implementation, as well as an 
empirical study to analyse common obstacles to strategy execution. 
This empirical study on strategy execution obstacles covered 12 items deemed relevant in 
strategy implementation issues. Hrebiniak came up with these 12 items through his work with 
the managers participating in the Wharton Executive Program on strategy implementation. 
The survey data collection had been divided between two sources of data; firstly, the 
Wharton-Gardner survey, in cooperation with the research institute Gardner Group, Inc., for 
which 1.000 Gardner e-panelists that identified themselves to be involved with either strategy 
formulation and execution have been asked to respond to a questionnaire, including open-
ended questions, on 12 strategy implementation items. 243 individuals have answered. 
Secondly, the Wharton Executive Education Survey within which another sample of 200 
managers, participants in the executive program, has also been asked about the same 12 items. 
Together this accounts for a sample size 443 participants. From the results of these surveys, 
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and panel discussions about its results in subsequent years of the executive program, 
Hrebiniak came up with this model of strategy implementation.  
This model sees a less distinct separation into strategy formulation and implementation, 
formulators and implementers. This is seen in the model’s flow of logic and its recognition of 
the equal importance of corporate strategy and business strategy. As Hrebiniak (2005) 
acknowledges, both strategies need to be 
right in order for the company to succeed, 
and both are made on different 
organisational levels, thereby spreading the 
roles and orders of strategy formation and 
implementation over multiple hierarchical 
levels. Business-level strategy must meet 
business-level requirements and conditions 
in order to be able to fulfil corporate 
requirements. This in itself is a common 
supposition of the annual planning logic, as it is occurs within functions and business units. 
Hrebiniak (2006) states that corporate strategy, i.e. items such as portfolio management, 
diversification and resource allocation across the businesses or operating units, influences 
business strategy, i.e. items such as products, services or how to compete. These given 
examples further accentuate this model’s inclusive understanding of strategy, that strategy 
spans everything a company does, all the operational activities, not just selected change items. 
While corporate strategy, always represents (neo-)strategic decisions taken at the top, business 
strategy contains all four decision types. Decisions taken on the corporate strategy level 
influence business strategy but remain on a higher level. Business strategy is then created in 
businesses and cascaded into short-term operating objectives through integration into the 
operational management, i.e. the annual planning. Business strategy spans all the activities a 
company carries out, making every employee an implementer of strategy and creating room 
for emergent strategy as part of employees’ every day work. Corporate and business structure 
and integration stand for the right balance of (de)-centralisation and the coordination of shared 
resources. For this, “integration mechanisms and structures (e.g. a coordinated global matrix) 
are again important” (Hrebiniak, 2008:4). This coordination is also helped by a clear 
alignment of roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, as is usually carried as part of the 
annual planning process. Next, closing the strategy implementation process, is the translation 
of business strategy into measurable short-term objectives and incentives. Measurable 
Figure 7: “Making strategy work”, (2005) 
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objectives provide control points, while incentives provide the right motivation for employees 
to implement a given strategy. Hrebiniak (2005) proposes the use of the Balanced Scorecard 
for integrating business strategy into short-term objectives and metrics; it “helps to develop 
and communicate short-term objectives in the area of financials, customer service, internal 
business processes and learning and growth, and it attempts to link these objectives to 
company strategy and long-term goals” (p.87). The Balanced Scorecard is frequently used as 
part of the annual planning processes and belongs to the tools for measuring continuous 
business issues.  
 
Like Morgan et al.’s (2007) strategic execution framework this model provides an 
organisation-wide insight into how the strategy implementation process can be managed and 
organised. However, this framework does not have the same project-management character; it 
is not an initiative-driven model. Instead it draws on the mechanisms provided through the 
regular business planning process, i.e. the annual planning process or its equivalent. While the 
SEF® does not especially mention typical people management systems such as reward and 
promotion schemes, this framework stresses their importance and embeds the strategy 
implementation process within. Therefore, contrary to Morgan et al.’s (2007:8) belief that 
“Hrebiniak comes tantalizingly close to writing the word project but instead dances around it 
with words like integrated activities, activity systems, processes”, Hrebiniak’s approach is 
different from their own. Hrebiniak (2005) refers to operational planning systems and 
processes, those already present within the organisation, thereby fully integrating strategy 
implementation into operations. The particular advantage of this model is its clear cut 
distinction between different organisational levels and the cascading of strategy to lower 
levels. This cascading is explained in a straight-forward way, calling special attention to the 
difficulties related to issues such as coordination, and is easily applicable to any organisation. 
However, both models stay on rather high, abstract level and provide limited details about 
how to translate the strategy into business structure level incentives and controls (Hrebiniak, 
2005) or projects (Morgan et al., 2007). This lack of detail makes them adaptable to most 
organisations, without giving too detailed information on how exactly to implement them. In 
consequence, each company interprets the models differently and develops their own modes 
of operation, adapted from past experience and organisational designers’ inputs, which 
ultimately causes the diversity of processes encountered in the business world.  
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2.2.3 COMMON FEATURES IN THE STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESSES 
One of the most cited pieces of research on strategy implementation processes by Alexander 
(1991) assessed eight strategy implementation models published between 1965 and 1987. 
Alexander analysed their common features and came to the conclusion that four factors are of 
very high or high importance – organisational structure and control mechanism (very high), as 
well as reward systems and Objectives (high) – while another five features seemed to appear 
but be of lower importance because of their relatively lower rate of repetition – task, 
people/human resources, information and decision processes, culture and management 
processes.   
Comparing the two processes, initiative-driven and annual planning-driven, to Alexander’s 
(1991) study’s results, two areas with remarkable differences are evident. These mirror the 
processes’ particular take on strategy implementation. The initiative-driven model places a 
high importance on tasks, i.e. making strategy actionable through the cascading of strategy 
into tasks, projects and programs. The initiative-driven also stands out through the high 
importance it places on management processes, i.e. the cascading of strategy into projects and 
programs which requires defined management processes for implementation and follow-up. 
These two factors, task and management process, further demonstrate the higher level of 
detail of strategy-content, strong deliberate element of strategy and strong corporate control 
required by the initiative-driven process model.    
 
Alexander,              
(1991) 
Morgan, Levitt & 
Malek, (2007) 
Hrebiniak,          
(2005) 
Organisation 
Structure 
Very high Very high Very high 
Task Moderately low High Moderately low 
People / Human 
Resources 
Moderate Moderate Moderately high 
Reward Systems High High High 
Information and 
decision systems 
Moderate High Moderately low 
Objectives High Very high High 
Culture Moderate Moderately low Moderately high 
Management 
Processes 
Moderately low High Moderate 
Control 
Mechanisms 
Very high High High 
Table 2: Strategy implementation process attributes, comparative table 
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Considering the implementation process’ effect on employee participation, employee-driven 
change and renewal capacity, the design chosen might also have an influence on, or cause, 
certain implementation problems a company encounters. This hypothesis is highlighted when 
taking a closer look into the common pitfalls of strategy implementation as discovered in 
research and practice. The implementation process, either because of its sheer absence or its 
rigidness, is often found to be among the more important pitfalls, something that already 
Alexander (1991) observed, “one key reason why implementation fails is that practicing 
executives, managers and supervisors do not have practical, yet theoretically sound, models to 
guide their actions during implementation” (p.74).    
 
 
2.3 PERFORMANCE PITFALLS IN STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
Strategy implementation is an important, a crucial, part of strategy work – it translates plans 
to actions and is therefore the condition for success. Yet, when looking into practice, 
“companies nonetheless often fail to operationalise their strategies in ways that improve the 
likelihood that they will be implemented effectively” (Sterling, 2003:27). While companies 
sometimes have elaborated brilliant strategies and high motivations for their implementation, 
many of them do not perform up to their expectations (Mankins & Steele, 2005). Why is this 
the case? A review of studies on strategy implementation problems will try to reveal the 
answer to this question by taking a closer look at what these difficulties are, where they occur 
in the strategy process and which assumptions they hold. 
 
2.3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW OF COMMON PROBLEMS 
In the author’s analysis of eight studies on strategy implementation pitfalls conducted by 
academics and practitioners, the same nine problems have been found repeatedly. Among the 
most common pitfalls to strategy implementation are “Bad Strategy”, “Uncontrollable 
environmental factors”, “Ineffective communication”, “Insufficient Coordination”, 
“Competing activities”, “Inadequate leadership”, “Lack of resources” and “Inadequate 
Information Technology Systems”. These pitfalls have been quoted in at least three of the 
assessed studies. Most of the other problems were found in at least two of the studies. 
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Alexander 
85, private 
Alexander 
86, public 
Crittenden & 
Crittenden 
2008 
Beer & 
Eisenstat,      
2000 
Stirling 
2003 
Wernhem
, 1984 
Mankins & 
Steele, 2005 
Hrebiniak, 
2006 
No direct relation to implementation process      
Bad strategy   x x x x  x 
More time than 
expected x x    x   
Previously unidentified 
problems x x       
Uncontrollable 
environmental factors x x   x    
Inability to overcome 
change        x 
Communication         
Ineffective 
communication   x x x  x  
Overall goals not 
understood  x   x    
Cooperation         
Lacking will to 
cooperate  x  x     
Conflicting individual 
goals  x    x   
Organisational silos       x x 
Insufficient 
Coordination x x x x    x 
Operationalisation        
Competing activities 
and crises x x x x     
Capabilities of 
employees insufficient x        
Inadequate training / 
instructions x  x      
Reward Systems not in 
line with strategy       x x 
Inadequate leadership x x x x     
Responsibilities 
insufficiently defined x      x x 
Lack of Accountability       x x 
Lack of Resources     x x x  
Lack of buy-in      x   
Missing Model for 
implementation        x 
Inadequate 
Information Sharing        x 
Strategy not in line with 
existing power structure      x  x 
Inadequate 
Performance 
monitoring       x  
 31 
 
Disconnection between 
formulators and 
implementors        x 
Support Systems         
Inadequate 
Information Systems x x    x   
Top Management roles         
Top management 
ineffective   x x     
Top-down or laissez-
faire management style   x x     
Poor senior leadership       x  
Table 3: Summary of strategy implementation problems 
These studies share the assumption that there is a clear allocation of roles and sequencing of 
activities in the strategy process; first top management formulates an initial intended strategy, 
then managers (on all organisational levels) implement this given strategy. In strategy 
implementation problems literature, it seems commonly understood that to-be-implemented 
strategy is deliberate.  
Some of the implementation problems found in the studies are not directly related to strategy 
implementation but rather with its formation. However, they are all mentioned here, because 
some of them might be treated partially also through changes in their implementation.   
 
2.3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW OF COMMONLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Academics are as often concerned with potential cures for these problems as they are with 
their causes. Hereafter is a summary of commonly proposed solutions to strategy 
implementation difficulties. As can be seen from table 4, most of these solutions could be 
integrated into an organised strategy implementation process. 
 Crittenden 
& 
Crittenden 
2008 
Dobni              
2003 
Stirling, 
2003 
Alexander, 
1985 
Neilson, 
Martin & 
Powers, 
2008 
Wernhem 
1984 
Mankins 
& Steele, 
2005 
Beer & 
Eisenstat, 
2000 
Raps, 
2004 
Hrebiniak
, 2006 
Higgins, 
2005 
Superordinate goal      x      
Optimised strategy 
making process   x x   x  x   
Involve managers in 
strategy development 
process 
  x x    x x X  
Ownership & Buy-in 
on all levels  x    x   x   
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Decisions are not 
second-guessed     x       
Get information from 
operational staff     x       
Good Strategy x  x  x x x   X  
Get an 
implementation 
process 
  x       X  
Effective 
Communication  x x x   x  x X  
Clear allocation of 
responsibilities     x    x   
Clear Accountability   x x     x  x 
Clear Prioritisation       x     
Action planning / 
budgeting   x    x     
More concrete 
strategy       x     
Sufficient resources x   x  x x    x 
Rewards system 
supports strategy x x     x  x  x 
(Cross-functional)-
Cooperation x    x  x    x 
Control - LT goals 
into ST objectives          X  
Effective Performance 
Monitoring   x    x  x   
Align organisational 
design and capabilites 
with the strategy 
  x         
Not directly related to Implementation Process          
Information is shared 
quickly through 
organisation 
    x x      
Culture / Shared 
Values x x         x 
Symbolic action   x         
Organisational 
learning x           
IT system for 
information sharing 
and decision-support 
x  x   x     x 
Develop / Train 
employee capabilities           x 
Good Leadership           x 
Top Management 
support      x      
Effective / Committed 
Top Management 
Team 
      x  x   
Table 4: Summary of solutions for strategy implementation problems 
The solutions offered by the literature are as diverse as the potential sources of the problem of 
ineffective or inefficient strategy implementation. Cross-checking the list of commonly 
appearing implementation problems with the commonly proposed solutions, it becomes 
evident that a well-defined, organised and thought out process might be able to address some 
of the issues or to prevent them from occurring in the first place.  
 33 
 
Solution
times 
mentioned
Problems solved through 
implementation process times 
mentioned
Optimised strategy making 
process
4
Involve managers in strategy 
development process
5 Lack of buy-in
1
Ownership & Buy-in on all levels 3
Decisions are not second-guessed 1
Disconnection between formulators 
and implementors 1
Get information from operational staff 1 Previously unidentified problems 2
Good (better) Strategy 6 Bad strategy 5
Get an implementation process 2 Missing Model for implementation
1
Effective Communication 6 Ineffective communication 4
Overall goals not understood 2
Clear allocation of responsibilities 2
Responsibilities insufficiently 
defined
3
Clear Accountability 4 Lack of Accountability 2
Clear Prioritisation 1 Competing activities and crises 4
Conflicting inidividual goals 2
Rewards system supports strategy 5
Reward Systems not in line with 
strategy 2
(Cross-functional)-Cooperation 3 Lacking will to cooperate
2
Action planning / budgeting 2 Insufficient Coordination 5
More time than expectd 3
More concrete strategy 1
Capabilities of employees 
insufficient
1
Sufficient resources 5 Lack of Resources
3
Control - LT goals into ST objectives 1
Effective Performance Monitoring 3
Align organisational design and 
capabilites with the strategy
1
 
Figure 8: Mapping of strategy implementation solutions with strategy implementation problems 
From this it becomes evident that treating the issues related to the strategy implementation 
process can treat 17 of the altogether 28 documented problems in strategy implementation.  
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2.4 CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER 
In this chapter, fundamentals of the strategy process research string have been introduced. The 
underlying theories on how strategy is implemented have been discussed and will be used in 
the following chapters in order to assess the strategy implementation processes and problems 
encountered in an empirical study of four case companies.  
The strategy implementation process is part of an organisation’s structure; it has a strong 
influence on how effectively a formulated intended strategy is transformed into realised 
strategy. In section 2.1.5 the strategy implementation process has been defined to start with 
the communication of the current year’s intended strategy. It comes from top management, is 
communicated to the rest of organisation and represents the ends towards which an 
organisation works. So, initially there is always a clear sequencing of formation and 
implementation, as well as a clear allocation of roles across the hierarchy (Li et al., 2008). 
However, from there on, differences in processes can be noted. After communication, 
intended strategy is implemented by organisational members on all levels by means of 
deliberate and emergent strategy. Deliberate strategy corresponds to the implementation of 
rightly understood intended strategy; emergent strategy corresponds to the implementation of 
falsely understood intended strategy or of employees’ own perception of strategy (Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1985). Thus, the extent to which strategy implementation is deliberate or emergent 
depends on how well the intended strategy is communicated across the organisation and how 
accommodating the implementation process is for emergent strategy. Table 5 shows the four 
identifiers that have been developed throughout the literature review that qualify 
implementation action as either deliberate or emergent strategy:  
 Deliberate Strategy Emergent Strategy 
Strategy Goal 
Declared strategy by TM  
(intended strategy) as starting point 
Strategy as understood 
 / own idea as starting point 
Sequence 
Induced strategic behaviour  
– triggered by rightly understood     
strategy and shared ideas 
Formation    Implementation 
Autonomous strategic behaviour  
– triggered by falsely understood 
strategy or own ideas 
Formation    Implementation 
Decision types taken    
in implementation 
Tactical and operational,                 
(neo-)strategical decisions have been 
taken in strategy formation 
All four types occur,                                          
as employees implement their perception 
of strategy in daily operations 
Roles 
Top Management makes strategy,          
Top and Middle mgmt implement 
Top and Middle management formulate 
and implement strategy 
Table 5: Summary of identifiers of deliberate and emergent strategy  
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In more detail, the process, starting with communication, can be assessed based on its rigidity, 
flexibility and openness to employee participation. Further, the extent to which middle 
managers are free to “champion” projects and ideas within the strategic context as part of the 
implementation process is of interest. Another factor that influences the balance between 
deliberate and emergent strategies in the implementation process is the level of detail of the 
communicated intended strategy (Moore, 2009). Based on these indicators, a process can be 
defined as either being more deliberate or more emergent, thus, the level of corporate control 
is indicated. The more a process accommodates for deliberate strategy, the higher the need for 
corporate control is.   
Formation
Implementation (deliberate)                                          
and Formation (emergent)
Operationalisation
Intended Strategy          Deliberate Strategy Realised Strategy
          - Communication
          - Level of detail of
            intended strategy
          - Rigidness of 
            structural context
         Emergent Strategy
          - Shared or individual goal alignment
          - Flexibility / openness of structural context
          - Strategic context
 
Figure 9: Mintzberg & Waters (1985), adjusted for strategy implementation processes 
 
Translating this concept of deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) as 
well as the strategy implementation process indicators “role ascription”, “sequencing” and 
“content” (Floyd & Lane, 2000) discussed in this literature review into the two discussed 
strategy implementation process design types, initiative-driven (Killing et al., 2005; Morgan 
et al., 2007) and annual planning-driven (Hussey, 1999; Hrebiniak, 2005), it is evident that the 
two process types have very different understandings of what constitutes strategy content and 
how process attributes are composed. While in the initiative-driven process intended strategy 
is rather detailed and tackles single change items, in the annual planning-driven process it 
contains operational items. Also, the initiative-driven process is more tightly knit, i.e. it shows 
stronger sequencing and role ascription, and has stronger corporate control, than is the case in 
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the annual planning-driven process. In general, the annual planning-driven process shows a 
higher degree of integration of strategic issues into the operational business and has a higher 
employee participation rate because all employees are part of implementation.  
 Initiative-driven Annual Planning-driven 
Strategy   
Level of detail Set of initiatives Corporate and Business Strategy 
Content Change items  Operational business 
Process   
Roles 
Clear division into                
Formulators and Implementers 
Less clear division into           
Formulators and Implementers 
Sequencing Strong Less clear 
Implemented through 
Action plans;                              
tactical &                            
operational decisions 
Annual plans;                             
(Neo-)strategic, tactical & 
operational decisions 
Strategy implementation              
is driven strongly by 
Deliberate strategy Deliberate and Emergent strategy 
Table 6: Attributes of initiative-driven and annual planning-driven strategy implementation processes 
 
 
In the following empirical study the author will assess each strategy implementation process 
by its strategy content, process design, relative strengths and encountered implementation 
problems; strategy content will be identified as either containing all an organisation’s 
operational issues or only selected change items, the strategy process design will be identified 
as either initiative- or annual planning-driven, and strengths and problems of the processes 
will be described and discussed. Subsequently, in the cross case analysis, strategy content and 
design types will be matched to strategy implementation problems and a potential match 
between content, design and implementation problems will be established.  
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3. METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 
In this chapter the author will provide explanations on the study’s objective, her choice of 
research design, the details on how and from where the data has been collected, as well as 
how obtained data was analysed. Furthermore, issues of ethics will be discussed and the thesis 
results will be evaluated in terms of validity, transferability and limitations. 
 
3.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
This is an exploratory study that seeks to understand, in a first step, how the strategy 
implementation process is managed in four mature internationally active Finnish industrial 
companies. In a second step, the study aims to discover the company-specific implementation 
pitfalls within each one of the processes encountered. In a final third step, the study takes an 
explanatory stand and aims to analyse if specific implementation problems can be assigned to 
particular strategy content and implementation processes. In light of this objective, the study 
takes a post-positivist approach, aiming to propose a theory which might be transferable to 
other, similar settings.  
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study analyses how strategy content and implementation processes are related to strategy 
implementation pitfalls and aims to provide a theory to help organisational architects choose 
the right implementation process for their organisation. For this, a qualitative multiple case 
study is employed.  
 
3.2.1 RATIONALE FOR QUALITATIVE STUDY 
Given the theory-building objective of the study, a qualitative method is chosen. Qualitative 
methods allow a more deep analysis, making use of more detailed data. Interviewees are not 
limited in their choice of words and expressions, and they have more room to freely share 
their thoughts. Qualitative research also takes into account non-verbal communication such as 
breaks between words, signs, symbols or facial expressions – data that remains inaccessible in 
case of quantitative research. While these have not been used for analysis in this work, their 
acknowledgement during interviews allowed the researcher to more effectively gather more 
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detailed data. Moreover, the qualitative approach provides a greater flexibility in terms of 
topics to be analysed, allowing new trends and topics to emerge along the process, rather than 
fixing the boundaries of interest too early on in the process. The researcher can conduct an 
individual in-depth research of every individual interviewee, instead of using the exact same 
design and approach for all interviewees. As new topics or potential areas of further 
investigation emerge during one interview, the researcher gets a chance to build upon this new 
knowledge in subsequent interviews. By making use of this possibility to customise questions 
to the interviewees’ personality, experience and position, the researcher is able to gain a more 
thorough insight into the individuals’ thoughts and rationale, and, thus, altogether a greater 
understanding of how the strategy implementation process works in different organisations 
and how it is perceived among organisational members.  
 
3.2.2 A MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY  
Piekkari, Welch and Paavilainen (2009) define a case study to be “a research strategy that 
examines, through the use of a variety of data sources, a phenomenon in its naturalistic 
context, with the purpose of "confronting" theory with the empirical world” (p.569). In this 
way, using a case study allows the researcher to dive deep into the workings of one company 
and understand on the micro-level why things occur the way they do without the need to 
include broader data from outside of the case company. The researcher is able to obtain a 
maximum of diverse information which will enhance her ability to find a holistic explanation 
and build a theory that takes account of all information available. This allows for an in-depth 
understanding of one particular case, the results of which may then later be transferred to be 
tested on other cases.  
Yet, this study seeks to analyse the phenomenon of strategy work within its real-life context 
on a broader scale. Rather than just looking at how one case company organises, manages and 
interacts with its own process, this thesis aims to look at how companies on a more general 
level do this. Therefore, it makes sense to expand the design from a single case to a multiple 
case study. Hence, it is not the micro-level within one company alone anymore that the 
researcher is looking at, but the micro-level within multiple companies. These different 
micro-level analyses taken together, each one not quite as exhaustively analysed as it would 
be the case for a single case study (only two or three interviews per case company), make up 
the new level of analysis for this thesis. While each case company in itself would make a 
good single case study, taken together, they make a multiple case study design.  
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The reasons for the researcher’s multiple case study approach are two-fold. Firstly, the chosen 
research question requires this design. This multiple case study design is necessary in order to 
be able to compare multiple strategy implementation processes, as every company usually 
employs only one process. Even if a company has no formalised implementation process so 
that every employee pursues their own process or if one company pursues different processes 
within different parts of the organisation, this counts as one process, i.e. an unformalised 
process or a differentiated process as opposed to one identical formalised process for the 
whole organisation. Secondly, this approach does not look at critical cases, but at the 
“industry norm”, at how any given company implements its strategy. Looking at multiple case 
companies provides a more “robust” (Herriot & Firestone, 1983, quoted in Yin, 2009) study 
design and its results are more compelling thanks to the “replication” inherent to the multiple 
case design (Yin, 2009). By choosing four case companies, i.e. four literal replications where 
similar results are expected (Yin, 2009), the researcher is able to present a more compelling 
theory about how strategy content and implementation processes are connected to strategy 
implementation processes than would be the case looking at just one case company.  
Yin (2009) suggests that the multiple case study should start from a developed theory, which 
might be redefined after each single-case company component has been finished, and then 
after the individual cases’ reports have been written, cross-case conclusions can be drawn, the 
theory can be modified and implications can be made, before the cross-case report can be 
written. However, this thesis has no one developed theory as starting point, but instead a 
collection of existing research on strategy implementation processes and problems. Starting 
from there, data from the real-life context within the case companies is gathered and analysed. 
Only in the cross-case analysis phase will there be a theory development. This is the case 
because of the exploratory nature of this work.  
Disadvantages of this design choice are mostly related to the larger need of time required for 
analysing multiple case companies. As this is a master’s thesis, there is not sufficient time to 
look more deeply into each company than through two or three interviews. This leads to a loss 
of information, as each case company could provide much more information than only that 
collected for the purpose of this study. The researcher hopes to make up for this by collecting 
the most complete and relevant information possible during interviews and selecting the most 
relevant interviewees.   
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3.2.3 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND CASE-COMPANIES CHOICE 
When starting her work on the thesis, the researcher contacted various mature, internationally 
active Finnish industrial companies with the proposal to become the case company in a 
single-case study on the strategy implementation process. However, responses from the 
contacted companies were not in favour of a single-study. Instead, the potential participants 
were interested in seeing how strategy implementation is done on an industry-wide scale. As a 
consequence, the researcher changed her design to a multiple-case study in order to better 
meet the needs of the business community and to supply more relevant information to the 
participating case companies. Accordingly, the unit of analysis of this multiple case study is 
the strategy implementation process within mature, internationally active Finnish industrial 
companies.  
The case companies have been selected mostly by means of access. Criteria have been that 
they are Finnish companies, founded in Finland with their head office still in Finland, that 
they are mature organisations and that their operations are international, i.e. they have a 
minimum of around 40% of their total sales outside of Finland. Furthermore, only industrial 
companies have been accepted, i.e. the case-companies’ business had to be based in the 
production of their own products, where the type of products – consumer or capital goods – is 
not of importance. Another criterion has been that the selected companies are willing to 
participate with at least two interview partners. Some other companies have signalled interest 
to meet the researcher for a quick chat, but this deemed unhelpful for the purpose of truly 
understanding a case company’s strategy process.  
The selected companies are all mature Finnish industrial companies with at least 40% of sales 
generated outside Finland. Four case companies have been selected, details on turnover and 
regional sales figures can be found in appendix 1.   
 Employees Industry 
Company A      150 Building & Construction 
Company B   4,500 Food 
Company C 14,000 Food 
Company D 11,000 Capital Goods 
Table 7: Case companies 
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3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
This research uses primary data gathered from in-depth semi-structured interviews, but also 
includes some participant observation in case company D. 
For primary data, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews and, within case 
company D, some participant observation during the strategy communication event took 
place. The goal was to conduct the interviews in a style that resembles unstructured, informal 
conversational interviews as much as possible. This interview style enables the researcher to 
get highly personal, individual insights into the participants’ situation. The in advance 
prepared semi-structured interview guide was meant only for keeping the conversation going 
in case no free conversational flow emerged, to verify after the “natural” conversation 
whether all points have been touched upon and to fall back on in case the conversation has 
strayed too far from the original ideas. Accordingly, different interviews have varied quite a 
bit one from another, depending on how talkative the respective interviewee was and how 
relaxed the interview progressed. This approach fits the purpose of the study to find out what 
strategy implementation processes are in use in the case companies and which are common 
problems (particularly for this the semi-structured question guide guaranteed that for all 
participants the same corner points have been discussed), but it also leaves room for 
participants to talk about points they consider important in relation to this topic, their 
perceived role in the process and their personal thoughts on it. From these remarks, not asked 
for directly, but volunteered on the participants’ own initiative, important hints could be 
picked up by the researcher. Like in “pure” informal conversational interviews, the researcher 
was building on participants’ previous comments and this way was able to dive deep into the 
participants’ thoughts.  
The interviews were conducted at the case companies’ participants’ convenience. Most 
interviews occurred at the case companies’ premises, but one interview was conducted in 
Café Fazer in Forum in Helsinki, one interview was conducted in Café Fazer in Kluuvikatu in 
Helsinki and three interviews have been conducted over Skype or Lync. The interviews have 
all been conducted one-to-one with the interviewer, so that the interviewee would feel free to 
express their true opinions and insights without fearing to be overheard. Interviews have been 
conducted in English language because the interviewer is lacking sufficient Finnish language 
skills to conduct the interviews in Finnish. This was a cause for difficulties in two interviews 
when respondents would have been more comfortable answering in their mother tongue and 
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some meaning might have gotten lost in inaccurate translations or expressions. Furthermore, 
this sometimes interrupted the conversational flow as interviewees were looking for the right 
words to express themselves. The interviews lasted each between 45 to 100 minutes and there 
was one interview per interviewee. After the interviews there was an opportunity for the 
researcher to get back in writing to some of the participants for verification. However, since 
daily business needs keep the participants busy, only quotes have been send for verification. 
In addition, the researcher has observed and actively emerged herself in the strategy 
communication event at company D. This provided the researcher with the opportunity to 
gain a thorough understanding of one of the implementation process steps within this 
company by experiencing the process in its natural environment as participant.  
The overall time period of data collection, from the first interview to the last, is seven months. 
One reason for this long period is the fact that the researcher started her interviewing process 
while on student exchange and finding times for the interviews was difficult. To her opinion, 
interviews yield better results when conducted in person and she therefore accepted longer 
timeframes in exchange for better interview results. Another reason for this long period is the 
lengthy process of finding suitable case companies and participants within them. Participants 
often did not reply emails directly and had difficulties making time for the interview.  
From each company the researcher interviewed three participants; only in case company A 
there were only two. Participants were selected based on their position in the company and 
their role in the strategy process, as well as their willingness to participate in the study. After 
having established contact with the “process architect” and having conducted one interview 
with them, the researcher asked for further contacts within the same organisation for another 
interview. These further contacts fulfilled the roles of “implementers” within the strategy 
implementation process. The criterion for acceptance as participant to this study was their 
identified role in strategy implementation, i.e. they all had white-collar level jobs with a 
certain level of decision-power, managerial responsibility and freedom in terms of their work 
organisation comparable to middle or top management.  
Moreover, the researcher used some secondary data from external data sources, i.e. the 
corporate webpages, for informing herself about the companies and complementing 
information. This material is used in order to better understand the organisations context.  
In collecting the data, ethical considerations had high standards. The main issues at stake were 
to ensure the interviewees’ anonymity and confidentiality as well as managing their 
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expectations and giving feedback on the process of the study. Anonymity and confidentiality 
are assured in order to guarantee that the interviewees’ day-to-day actions at work will not be 
influenced by their participation in the study. The interviews need an atmosphere of trust for 
the interviewees to open up. However, this was also important for the researcher, because 
without such an atmosphere, it is difficult to get high quality answers and insights for the 
researcher. All interviews have been recorded and transcribed with the interviewees’ consent. 
The case companies had to agree that the responses of individuals would be treated 
confidentially and participation of all participants was voluntary, without any kind of force 
and with the opportunity to withdraw responses given. The researcher gave feedback on the 
process of her work and was always available for questions. Moreover, since this is a 
multiple-case study and two of the participating companies have asked for anonymity the 
companies remain unnamed. This created some difficulties in quoting, but these difficulties 
have been dealt with cautiously.  
 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
Prior to going deep into data analysis, the data obtained needed to be managed and organised 
in order to facilitate the following data analysis. All interviews have been audio recorded and 
afterwards transcribed. However, the researcher also took notes on specific things she 
observed during the interviews. The transcribed interviews have been entered into the 
ATLAS.ti software, where it has been coded and treated for further analysis.  
 
3.4.1 ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES AND WORK 
Typically, data analysis would occur after the data collection is complete, yet, in this study 
collection and treatment occurred to some extent simultaneously. The comprehensive nature 
of qualitative data requires ongoing data analysis right after the first interview. This has two 
main reasons; firstly, waiting for the last interview to be finished to start the analysis would 
mean to miss the opportunity to optimise interview questions according to the results of 
previous interviews. This is especially the case for the semi-structured interviews used in this 
study, which from the outset will never be identical and each additional interview of 
experience will make the next interview a greater success with even better insights. Secondly, 
the long time period between the first interview and the last, seven months in this case, might 
disconnect the researcher from the topic. 
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In analysing the data, the researcher applied an adapted version of the framework technique as 
described by Gale et al. (2013). An analytical framework is described as “a set of codes 
organised into categories that have been jointly developed by researchers involved in analysis 
that can be used to manage and organise the data” (Gale et al., 2013:1). The researcher has 
thus followed the seven steps, increasing at each step the adaption of the process to the 
empirical study at hand. First, interviews were transcribed (step 1) and the researcher 
immersed herself in the audio-recordings and transcriptions (step 2). Then, the researcher 
began to ‘open-code’ (step 3), i.e. “coding anything that might be relevant” (Gale et al., 
2013:4), building the codes without pre-conceived ideas about codes. This ‘open-coding’ was 
carried out for all interviews of case company C. When all interviews for case company C had 
been ‘open-coded’, the researcher grouped different codes into categories, or code families 
such as “strategic enablers” or “implementation problems” (step 4). This harmonized some of 
the codes given. Following this, the researcher merged some codes with identical meaning. 
When moving on the next case company’s interviews, the researcher used the established 
codes to code interviews (step 5) and added new codes where the existing ones did not apply 
(step 4 again). After all interviews of this case companies have been coded, the researcher 
repeated the harmonization of codes and code categories (step 4 again). This process has been 
repeated for the remaining two case companies. Once all coding was completed, the 
researcher went on to chart the codes and code categories in a network view (step 6). Each 
code family was drawn in a network view with the belonging codes and the codes’ and their 
quotations’ relationship to each other. The resulting network views indicated the areas for 
analysis; the understanding of strategy as concept, the workings of the strategy 
implementation process, the strengths of the process and the problems of the process. From 
this, the researcher started her interpretation (step 7) by analysing the codes, the relation 
between the codes and the indexed quotations.  
The question of quoting was difficult to approach because of the small number of 
interviewees in each case company. In order to not give too much indication of who exactly 
gave the quote, quotes are only indicated by the company from which they come, not the 
individual source. Also, in writing the quotes, they have been “cleaned”, leaving out pauses 
and other non-verbal exclamations that are not related to the content. The interviews being 
carried out in English, the analysis focused on the content of, not the way in which, something 
has been expressed.  
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3.4.2 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
First, an in-case analysis of each one of the four case companies has been conducted, 
analysing each company’s strategy content and implementation process type, its process’ 
strengths and implementation problems. All the in-case findings have been backed-up by 
quotes from the transcribed interviews for validity. In a second step, these empirical findings 
have been considered together and weighed against each other in a cross-case analysis in 
order to compare different strategy implementation processes and their implementation 
problems. From this cross-case analysis and in combination with the ground covered in the 
literature review, the researcher was able to present a framework that relates strategy content 
and strategy implementation process types to strategy implementation problems. This 
framework has been built from the integration of the empirical study results, the individual in-
case analyses, under consideration of the underlying theoretical frameworks from the 
literature review. Given the strictly qualitative nature of this study, there was no statistical 
testing. Nonetheless, in order to prove credibility of the outcomes, the built theory is based in 
known theory as presented in the literature review part. In consequence, this study’s 
framework complements existing theory.  
 
3.5 EVALUATION OF THE STUDY 
3.5.1 VALIDATION OF THE STUDY  
The study’s results fulfil standards for construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability. Hence, the study’s outcome is credible and replicable. 
Construct validity is given by triangulation and the maintaining of the chain of evidence. 
Patton (2002) suggests four kinds of triangulation; data, investigator, theory and 
methodological triangulation. The methods chosen for triangulation here are data and theory 
triangulation. Data triangulation occurred only limitedly because most companies have little 
documentation, archival material or physical artefacts for their strategy implementation 
process – interviews are the most reliable and accessible way to assess the strategy 
implementation process. Financial data and company performance, information more easily 
available through documentation can only give a hint on whether a strategy was successful or 
not, but the distinction of which part was successful or failed – strategy content or its 
implementation – can rarely be drawn from such sources, nor does it give much of an insight 
on how the strategy has been implemented. Therefore, the author made an effort to interview 
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multiple interviewees within each case company in order to prevent one-sided opinions and 
check whether different interviewees described the same processes and problems. Theory 
triangulation occurred through the wide selection of strategy implementation research and 
process models as well as published studies on strategy implementation pitfalls in the 
literature review. The results from this literature review have been used to frame the empirical 
findings and build the resulting theory. The chain of evidence is provided by having first 
audio-recorded the interviews, then transcribed them, and ultimately, in this work, having 
referenced back to the transcriptions by giving direct quotes.  
Internal validity is not really an issue in the exploratory phase when looking only at the single 
case companies and showing their strategy implementation processes and problems. However, 
in the explanatory phase of cross-case analysis where the strategy content- and process-
specific components are linked to implementation problems, this issue has been treated. Here, 
special attention has been paid to the analysis, making sure that inferences from process to 
problems are correct.  
The study fulfils external validity criteria because, albeit not generalizable, its results are 
transferable. Given its multi-case study design, a certain level of replication is already 
included in the theory development. By interviewing employees from different hierarchical 
levels and roles within the strategy implementation process the researcher creates a holistic 
view of what is happening in each one of the case companies.  Her cross-case analysis 
combines these insights and lifts them to a higher level of analysis where she builds a theory 
on how strategy implementation processes are connected to implementation problems. This 
resulting theory is credible and representative for the case companies. The researcher feels 
confident that the study could be replicated in any mature, internationally active Finnish 
industrial company. Yet, the results might vary when conducting the study in other 
companies, because despite the assumed general cause-effect relationship between strategy 
implementation process and implementation problems, every company operates in its own 
specific context which will need to be considered and may have an effect on the results.  
Concerning its reliability, the author is convinced that if carried out again, under the same 
circumstances, the study will yield the same results. 
 
3.5.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study shows two kinds of limitations; organisational and content-specific issues.  
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Organisational issues are mainly linked to the method of choice being a case study. Case 
studies require commitment, i.e. time and access, from the researcher and case companies. 
Particularly in this case, where the thesis has not been commissioned by any of the case 
companies but they only opted in as interview partner, this was difficult. Furthermore, the 
choice of participants was not structured. After an initial contact to the “process architect”, 
these architects proposed people they felt confident would be a good match for the thesis. 
There might be a certain bias to select those participants that are most willing to participate or 
likely to give “extreme” answers – positive or negative. Another issue is the interviewees pre-
disposition to share their thoughts, i.e. some might be more eager to share their thoughts and 
are more open to speak their mind than others, and the language barrier, i.e. the interviewees’ 
capacity to express their ideas in English. None of the interviewees, nor the interviewer, are 
native English speakers and command of the language might vary and thus influence the level 
of detail in which interviewees answer questions. Finally, there is also the issue of whether all 
information asked has been shared openly. When it comes to analysing a company’s 
employee satisfaction with their company’s strategy implementation process, an issue at least 
partly reflected in these results, companies might be sensitive and employees might be 
tempted to either over- or under-state their opinions according to their mood of the day and 
current work climate which might make it difficult compare responses directly.  
There are also more content-specific issues. The lack of scientific generalisability might pose 
a problem. This is a multi-case study which will not be entirely representative of a larger 
sample. Nonetheless, the author aims to present a theory that is as transferable as possible. 
Instead of a broad generalisable theory, this study provides one that will be transferable under 
certain conditions and caution. Although the qualitative case study approach is the best one to 
analyse the different strategy implementation processes and their associated problems, the 
researcher relies on the respondents’ honesty – a factor the researcher cannot control. 
Additionally, there is the issue of the semi-structured interviews held in a very loose manner, 
trying to come as close to an informal conversational style as possible. Their strength to give 
diverse and very individual information also acts as a weakness, because some selection needs 
to be made, causing the ignoring of some information, and because the responses are not 
always uniformly comparable. The researcher needs to select the right answers to pursue 
further and there is a risk that she might ignore some answers that do not fit the overall 
picture. This selection of “relevant” answers might be greatly influenced by the researcher’s 
own bias, whether she is aware of it or not. 
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
For each of the four case companies the author will assess their strategy in terms of intention 
and content, present the strategy implementation processes she encountered and discuss the 
processes’ strengths. Further, the respective strategy implementation problems that have been 
identified by the interviewees will be discussed. The strategy implementation processes are 
described using the identifiers “roles”, “sequence” and “decision-types”, as well as indicators 
about formality and corporate control, in order to show the balance between deliberate and 
emergent strategy.  
 
 
4.1  COMPANY A 
The case company was hit hard by the economic crisis triggered in 2008 and is now in a post-
restructuring phase. Having been downsized, its processes are streamlined and the workforce 
is reduced by about 50% as compared to before 2008. In its current form, the company has a 
functional structure. There is no corporate strategy function. 
4.1.1 STRATEGY AS DIRECTION 
Since 2008, the company is undergoing a change from its traditional manufacturing-focused 
to a market-focused mindset and has repositioned its brand from “luxury” to “reliable quality 
for good prices”. Still trying to build the company back to its pre-2008 state, the strategy 
clearly aims to drive growth. As such, it provides employees with a clear understanding of 
what they are aiming to achieve through their day-to-day activities, with practical instructions. 
Looking at the particular content at strategy then, considering that it includes many 
operational issues, it makes sense that each division has their own strategy, “strategy work is, 
is executed basically in these three different BAs, so how to grow in BA Finland is a different 
story than in BA Global or BA Russia”.  
Yet, these practical instructions are to a large part created in cooperation between top and 
middle management. Thus, strategy covers particular development topics “can we develop 
profitable B2B in Finland? In short period, 2 years, of time” as well as more general business 
development “E.g. presently we have 4 objectives: one is the sales network, then the second is 
growth in production, I won’t go into details, but...” or operational issues “calculating prices 
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with salesmen”. Strategy is not necessarily equal to change, but includes all those activities 
critical to business success. This connection of the strategy with daily tasks makes the strategy 
“practical” to employees.   
 
 
4.1.2 THE INFORMAL ANNUAL PLANNING-DRIVEN PROCESS 
The strategy implementation process is highly informal, and there is no formalised process for 
the company as a whole. With the strategy formation-phase driven by the CEO and a formal 
strategy implementation process lacking, strategy implementation lies entirely by the Business 
Area (BA) Directors. Each BA-Director can choose his own tools and management style for 
implementing strategy and does so by integrating strategy implementation into operational 
management routines. Accordingly, many different forms might be found in the different 
BAs. Schedules and deadlines might be imposed occasionally by the Board of Directors or 
CEO. Due to this informal approach and the small organisational size there is a strong 
participation of the CEO in the operational business and strategy implementation. In general, 
strategy is closely related to operational management.  
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Figure 10: Strategy implementation process, case company A 
Case company A’s model corresponds to the annual planning-driven model. However, it 
displays a high extent of informality. The company runs its strategy process as part of its daily 
operations. It goes even further into operational details than does the annual plan-driven 
model, as can be seen from “I think we talk a little about the strategy all the time – me and my 
foreman (name). And I know something about it before it comes back to me”. The concept of 
strategy and strategic projects covers most employees’ operational work, “we meet at least 
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once a month and (my supervisor) tells us what is going on and then I meet my sales men”. 
The initial starting point for strategy implementation is when the CEO communicates it to the 
BA-Directors. They take the instructions and are free to act how they choose as long as they 
think they will be able to achieve the goal through their chosen activities. Accordingly, from 
the initial outset top management implements the CEO’s intended strategy. However, the 
freedom they experience in doing so enables all kind four decision types, from tactical and 
operational to (neo-)strategic, and, thus, there is a big potential for emergent strategy among 
top and middle managers. The assigned roles are less distinct; while middle managers have 
the chance to formulate strategy through collaboration with top management or championing 
their own ideas, “we set up a target for a couple of years ahead, and then we think about 
what are the kinds of actions that we can do. So the people are empowered to think about the 
actions”, top managers might sometimes participate in implementing tactical and operational 
decisions, “Then, how to prioritise this, again, inside my BA we have the balanced scorecard 
approach, in the corporation we don’t have - we need to discuss with CEO (for cross-division 
issues)”. An example for this is the recent brand positioning which clearly shows the bottom-
up information flow for strategy formation, “Yes, yes I have seen. I think most of the main 
strategies now are somehow… we have, the directors are, which are now working at case 
company A, they are very new, they have been just a couple of years in our company. And I 
think the strategy (…)  have done people who have worked a long time in (case company A)”, 
before the result, the intended strategy as formulated by the top management, is 
communicated top-down for implementation “how often, if you look at it from a top-down, 
bottom-up perspective – would you say is it more top-down or bottom-up? Interviewee: Top-
down”. In that sense, implementation of strategy resembles much a kind of negotiation 
between middle and top management where “so what is analysis, what is communication you 
couldn’t argue”. Thus, there is a strong element of emergent strategy. However, as in all 
companies observed as part of this study, top management ultimately ratifies actions and in 
this case, official and binding strategy formation is done only by the CEO.   
 Process attributes 
Goal 
Given from CEO – general direction and development areas 
Division-specific: incl. Operational and development items 
 
“Does then everybody know, is there a clear ownership and responsibility of 
the strategy process ? Interviewee: That is the CEO” 
“ It (the strategy) comes from the board” 
Sequence 
Initially formation first, 
Then implementation & formation as part of Implementation 
 “So the direction is given, but the details, objectives inside the business need 
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4.1.3 STRENGTHS OF THE INFORMAL PROCESS 
This highly informal process has three main strengths; flexibility, clear strategy and 
understanding that strategy is an ongoing process.  
One large strength is the process’ inherent flexibility. Decisions can be made quickly, “And 
strategy is more dynamic than it is in bigger companies”, and communication ways are short, 
“Yes, it is like that. When I need something I go there and we discuss about”.  
Another strength is that strategy and positioning are clearly understood by the company’s 
employees. Strategy is communicated by the manager to his subordinates, this communication 
of the strategy revolves around tasks and operational issues, strategy thus becomes tangible, 
“Does it (the strategy) give you a very high-level idea of what to do or is it really a practical 
guideline? Interviewee: It is practical”. The strategy is tied directly to people’s reward and 
bonus schemes through KPIs that are anchored in business figures, “And, then when we go to 
remunerations or these kind of things, all the individual targets come directly from the 
business strategy”. In addition to providing a good follow-up tool for measuring strategy’s 
success, this clearly links everyday work to strategy. After the company changed its 
positioning and brand promise in recent years, most of the company employees now actively 
share the declared brand identity, “directors thought that we are just a luxus brand, and make 
just luxus houses for rich people and everybody is so happy that we are not using that 
strategy anymore. Because in Finland, we are not so luxus brand, we are just good qualified 
products for everybody”.  
The third strength of this process is the understanding that strategy is an ongoing process, 
“(my manager) tells me (about strategy work on other levels), because we have very often 
to be created with me” 
Decision-types All four types on all levels 
 
“The people are putting the input, I am talking about the middle management, 
like the guy you just met, they are actually in charge of the actions. Because 
they know the reality better than the manager” 
Roles 
Strategy Formation (CEO),  
Formation and Implementation (Top and Middle Management) 
 
“I feel as a manager, I need to communicate the main message then, my team, 
my organisation is much better than myself to formulate what it really means 
to their everyday life” 
Conclusion 
Highly informal, strong emergent elements in implementation,                                
No strict division between strategic and operational issues 
Table 8: Strategy implementation process attributes, case company A 
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meetings, and we meet at least once a month and (my manager) tells us what is going on and 
then I meet my sales men”. Thus, there is a strong interaction between operational business 
and strategic goals with ongoing follow-up and discussion, “weekly follow-up. Really tight if 
you compare it to other companies. Once a week we go through all the relevant measures”. 
Especially when continuing from one year’s implementation phase to the next formation 
phase, there is a strong information flow between the implementing and formation level, “so 
what is analysis, what is communication you couldn’t argue”. This is a strength that can only 
be found in small companies with informal management structures, because in larger 
companies the complexity would just be overwhelming.  
 
 
4.1.4 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
Case Company A encountered seven strategy implementation problems. However, when 
taking a closer look at them it becomes evident that they are just the various symptoms of two 
core problems. These core problems are unaligned target setting and resource scarcity.  
Source of Problem Implementation problem observed 
5.1 Unaligned target 
setting 
1. Resistance to cooperate 
2. Unaligned target setting 
3. Informal process leads to less information 
sharing across divisions 
5.2 Resource Scarcity 
4. Too high workload 
5. Too many projects 
6. Resource Scarcity 
7. Having to end projects before they are finished 
Table 9: Strategy implementation problems and sources of problems, case company A 
The biggest challenge for strategy implementation at case company A is a too high workload 
because of resource scarcity. This is largely due to the company’s economic situation and 
cannot be easily attributed to or solved by the implementation process.   
(1) Unaligned target setting causes competing goals among different organisational members 
and thus inhibits cooperation. “I know whom I can ask for help, but they don’t have enough 
time to help me, because they have enough work in their own department”. Thus, setting 
targets solely in individual employees’ own departments without giving an incentive to 
allocate a part of their time to collaborating with their colleagues leads to resistance to 
cooperation in situations of limited resources, i.e. time in this case.  
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This symptomatic issue of resistance to cooperation is also strongly related to the second large 
problem in the case company; (2) resource scarcity. Resource scarcity manifests itself in two 
ways in case company A; firstly, there is a too high workload for individuals, inhibiting them 
not only from fulfilling all their individual tasks, but also from allocating some of their 
working time to help their colleagues with their issues. Therefore, a major reason inhibiting 
collaboration is that “we have now too much work” and “I think everybody is just looking too 
much at their own work and try to do it as good as they can. And they don’t take care of other, 
like for example salesmen’s’ work”. This clearly shows that employees on a general level 
have to deal with large amounts of work, but even more that the current target setting system, 
occurring only within an employee’s assigned department inhibits collaboration. Moreover, 
this effect is strengthened by a lacking coordination between divisions sharing the same 
resources. Since every division manages their own business without a formalised way of 
sharing information about which actions are carried out in the other divisions, sharing 
resources is more difficult, “I’m aware of the challenges in, eg, the challenges in our other 
BAs, but I don’t know the actions. And there is I would say a constant conflict of interest 
regarding the common resources, like product development”. The lack of a formalised system 
also further increases the workload of management because in addition to their regular tasks, 
more administrative and process-related tasks need to be taken care of, “then comes the weak 
point that the only person who is managing it is myself, and regarding the system, there is no 
system”. However, it needs to be mentioned that this is an extreme case. After the company’s 
turnaround, many corporate functions have been reduced, “Eg customer relationship program 
what we are using we used to have 2 people working with it and now we have none”, leaving 
the remaining parts with larger amount of support activities that are not directly related to 
their tasks.  
Secondly, resource scarcity causes problems in the management of strategic projects. In case 
of limited resources and always new arising business and strategic challenges, the company 
cannot complete all its projects while starting the required new projects. As a result, some 
projects have to be ended before reaching completion in order to free resources for new 
projects. Hence, “quitting something is as important as starting something. Because, you 
know, you can’t fill a glass over its capacity”. This leaves some projects abandoned before 
they were completed, i.e. “all the time some things are not made”.  
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Figure 11: Strategy implementation problems and potential solutions, case company A 
  
Considering the implementation problems in case company A it is evident that a large portion 
cannot be fixed through an adapted implementation process. This portion of the 
implementation pitfalls, namely resource scarcity and too high workload, is related to 
operational issues and overall firm performance in a time when the company is managing its 
change from a manufacturing-focused to a market-focused company in a challenging 
economic climate. Nevertheless, a solution can partially be found in an optimised strategy 
implementation process – a process that manages to better manoeuvre its challenging external 
environment. In order to (#1) foster cooperation between different organisational members, 
targets should be set more with a view towards cooperation. This might provide an incentive 
for employees to help their colleagues out even when they are already busy. While resource 
scarcity’s effect on individuals’ workloads cannot easily be fixed by strategy implementation 
processes, the required stringent project management can be. Thus, (#2) the company should 
implement a formulated, structured and exact prioritisation scheme according to which 
continuation of a project is decided. Following this decision, ended projects need to be 
actively closed and this closing needs to be actively communicated across the organisation. 
The resources freed through this, can be invested in other projects and maybe this way, more 
projects can be actively pursued with the same amount of resources.  
 
 
 
#1 
#2 
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4.2 COMPANY B 
Case company B has not undergone any major changes throughout the last years and is in a 
stable state.  
The corporate structure is functional with multiple processes running across the functions. It 
is by its own admission a “post-matrix” organisation. Instead of being organised within one 
matrix, multiple matrices govern the interaction of the different functions and processes. 
These interactions are governed in an internal “special document of the governance of the 
company, where we have specified how these roles are divided and who is responsible for 
what.” The rules as explained in this handbook are more complicated than those of a common 
matrix, but due to the high degree of cross-functional and cross-process cooperation required, 
they manage to identify roles and responsibilities in a more exact manner. There is no strategy 
function, but the activity is owned by the CEO and a senior Vice President (VP), member of 
the executive board. 
 
 
4.2.1 STRATEGY AS GUIDING VISION 
The case company’s strategy resembles more a high-level vision than a strategy. By 
admission of the process architect, “it (the strategy) is not very precise”, but instead it is 
meant to guide through their everyday work 
“So people understand that our job is to maximize the value of the (raw material). 
So, then we all people in the company understand that the key part then is to find 
new kinds of products on the basis of (the raw material) of our owners, so value-
added products in the research, and, R&D department for example, and all the 
people working in the marketing now, that we have to find value-added, new value-
added products all the time, that we need to renew the product range and we have 
to market and build brands.”   
As strategy is meant as a guideline for all activities within the organisation, strategy is equal 
to operational tasks and all activities the company does can be counted as strategy 
implementation, “And, basically in every function, in every position of the company, can 
understand, can easily understand, if I do my job properly, it’s part of the implementation of 
the strategy”. Being owned by a cooperative, the company’s strategy is very simple: to 
increase the raw material providers’ profit.  As such, it is easily understood and internalised 
by all employees and valid for the whole organisation. There is only this one strategy, or 
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vision, valid for all. This is a stable strategy, looking to increase the raw material cost as much 
as possible, and not actively seeking for change – “the strategy is quite fixed. We don’t 
change it so often. I think the main strategy, or the main components of the strategy, they have 
been the same for the past 5 years at least”. The company opts to communicate a short and 
easily understood strategy message, supposed to reach all organisational members and 
intended to influence each individual employee’s work.  
 
 
4.2.2 THE ANNUAL PLANNING-DRIVEN PROCESS 
The strategy implementation process is the same throughout the organisation – one process 
for all functions and processes. However, the process is not very formalised, but is instead 
governed by a mix of tacit knowledge, trade cycles and corporate annual planning. The 
strategy implementation process is fully integrated into the annual planning and operational 
management – a necessity given the strong influence of its external environment on daily 
operations. Employees tend to be with the company for a long time and therefore much of the 
process is governed through experience, i.e. tacit knowledge, and corporate culture.  
Since the strategy has been stable for some years now, there is no clear distinction between 
the formation and implementation phases. Instead there is an ongoing cycle of refining the 
existing strategy as part of the annual planning process. As such, the process resembles more 
an iterative circle of formation and implementation through an annually repeated 
implementation of strategy. The strategy being made and implemented through these annual 
and trade cycles, there is large participation of middle management in strategy formation in 
the form of emergent strategy. For example, new products are developed during the trade 
cycles which might be driving future investment needs. However, roles remain so that higher 
hierarchical levels carry a higher degree of strategy formation than lower levels. This can be 
observed in the fact that top management retains its “ratifying” role for investment decisions 
as well as the fact that annual plans are still approved and changed by top management. 
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Figure 12: Strategy implementation process, case company B 
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However, there are many (neo)strategic decisions taken or championed also on the middle 
management level. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS 
The process has three strengths; the large amount of freedom granted to employees in 
carrying out their tasks, the great capability to cooperate across functions and a high level of 
employee engagement. Considering the informal nature of the process and its base in the 
operational environment, these three strengths are also a necessity for successful strategy 
implementation as without them, strategy could most likely not be implemented.  
Firstly, the high level of freedom in organising their work allows employees to bring in their 
ideas and do things their way, “there are so many different kinds of personalities, and 
different functions and cultures, and if you make it too formal, it somehow doesn’t work, 
really. It demands and requires lots of support resources. And in the end you see, that it still 
 
Process attributes 
Strategy        
content 
Very high-level vision communicated top-down and internalised 
within employees – gives clear direction.  
Corporate wide-strategy: includes only operational issues and direction 
Strategic focal areas may vary year-to-year, but are less known.  
 
“So the strategy acts as basis for the annual planning process”, 
 “In the strategy we don’t have any financial targets. It’s more action-
oriented, or direction” 
Sequence The main vision being stable, there is a less distinct sequence.  
 
“When we go to the annual planning part, then it’s all the business units 
they have their own responsibility for that.” 
Decision-types More (neo-)strategic decisions on higher levels 
 
“But in the strategy we don’t give any exact figures, they come only after 
the planning process itself” 
Roles 
Top Management formation and “ratification”, 
Middle Management implementation and less formation 
 
“I kind of think it has been let to us to take those actions you feel necessary 
yourself. How did you understand this strategy, then you do those actions. 
That’s not very… uh.. very tight or very organised way of working or 
bringing the strategy into live.” 
Conclusion 
Vision is given top-down, but in implementation there are strong 
emergent elements. The reasons are two-fold; all is possible if argued 
through vision and the operational nature of the process 
Table 10: Strategy implementation process attributes, case company B 
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doesn’t work as planned. So, we have given quite a lot of freedom to functions, to heads of 
functions and directors to implement it, to communicate it as they want”. This causes 
motivated employees to feel that their input is important and works in itself as motivator, “I 
think it gives those people who want to reach higher and are ambitious and want to do a lot 
and the effect on things – it is good for those”.  
Cooperation is enabled by the shared vision, i.e. uniform understanding and agreement, and 
shared goals. Furthermore, strategy is supported by a simple, but effective bonus system that 
further highlights this shared vision. Bonuses for all employees come from two sources, one 
identical KPI for all employees, the cost of the raw material, and one more individualised 
bonus coming from an employee’s direct team, the “biggest part of the bonus system is the 
same for all of us. But then there are some, e.g. I am responsible for snacking brands, so the 
margin or the profitability I get my bonuses from is fresh products or the snacking brands, not 
cheeses or butter. But the one closest to my own territory. It is basically, how it is divided by 
BU or category, but not more detailed”. Thus, there are no individual bonuses. Employees 
from different areas share the same target, eliminating some of the issues arising from 
competing goals occurring in other companies. This bonus system matches the inclusive 
understanding of strategy and underlines the importance of every employee’s engagement.  
Hence, employees know what is expected of them, see their role in strategy implementation 
and have the freedom to participate to their best ability.  This creates strong engagement.  
 
 
4.2.4 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
At case company B, seven strategy implementation problems have been identified. While the 
source of some of the problems is the same as in other case companies, the manifested 
problems are different. The core problems in case company B are resource scarcity, missing 
link between strategy and action, decision rights not matching responsibilities and the low 
level of formalisation of the process. 
Source of Problem Implementation problem observed 
(1) Resource Scarcity 
1. Communication requires time  
2. Too many projects 
(2) Decision rights to do not 
match responsibilities 
3. Decision rights to do not match 
responsibilities 
(3) Not formalised process 
4. Lacking transparency 
5. People are less informed 
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6. Varying implementation quality 
(4) Missing Link between 
strategy an actions 
7. Missing Link between strategy an 
actions 
Table 11: Strategy implementation problems and sources of problems, case company B 
 
 
The biggest challenge case company B is facing is the lack of transparency inherent to highly 
informal, tacit processes. 
The (1) resource scarcity causes two kinds of problems, both related to the time the case 
company’s employees have available. In the first case it is the fact that communicating the 
strategy costs time. In order to make sure that the strategy really reaches all employees, an 
immense amount of time needs to be spent. Thus, the company needs to make a trade-off 
between time spent communicating its strategy and size of the audience it wants to reach. 
Case company B came to the result that “but how much to invest on it to make the people who 
are not interested to try to make them interested. I think that it’s sometimes just not worth it. 
Doesn’t pay the cost.” Accordingly, the responsibility to be aware of the details of the 
strategy lies with the employees. This demonstrates the big difference between this case 
company and the other ones; employee engagement and participation. Case company B builds 
its strategy implementation on all its motivated, engaged employees. Employees are aware of 
the freedom they have in creating their everyday work and the impact they can have on 
corporate development, as well as of their own responsibility for doing so “Who is 
accountable for making the strategy work? Interviewee: Good question, basically I think it is 
each of us”. This bottom-up way of formulating strategy as part of annual strategy 
implementation creates a feeling of ownership among employees “When we go to the annual 
planning part, then it’s all the business units they have their own responsibility for that”. 
However, this is very reliant on the individual employee’s willingness to be engaged and their 
proper understanding of the intended strategy. Thus, not investing the time in properly 
communicating the strategy might prove problematic – especially in such an emergent 
strategy-driven process.  
The company’s “post-matrix” structure causes problem (2) decision rights do not always 
match responsibilities. In order to make projects work, many different functions and 
processes need to collaborate through the trade cycle and annual planning processes, 
interactions governed through the handbook and years of experience. There is also a certain 
level of flexibility and constant change because of external requirements by the trade. The 
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problem related to this lies in the fact that sometimes the decision rights are not held by the 
same instance as the responsibility, “within case company B I think the plans can be changed 
like this, and they do change like this… And it is, the planning process is more loose, it is not 
that structure or concentrated as we had inside (my previous employer), very formal 
templates and schedules and, the process that we went through within each year, the 
budgeting was much more formal and template focused. It was much more structural”.  
The strategy implementation process at case company B is (3) not formalised beyond the 
operational planning. Strategy communication is done as the head of a function sees it best, 
“But that’s not very formal. That’s just something that we ask them to do, but how they make 
it is up to them. We don’t have any specific tools or process”, the follow-up is done how it is 
seen best and even day-to-day use of templates varies according to people’s preferences “We 
have kind of templates, but people use it or not, and they fill in the templates that they feel 
best”. This allows the personal touch and invites mangers to engage. However, this also 
causes varying levels of implementation quality, “we have given the freedom for the different 
heads of department of whatever, to make their own implementation of their communication, 
and then on the targets and follow-up of the targets, so it means that there are different ways 
in the different parts of the company how they are implemented. And of course that means that 
there are better and worse ways of doing it. It’s a result of the fact that we have given this 
freedom”. This way, some people in the organisation know more about the latest focus in the 
strategy, others less. Also, the low level of formalisation offers high flexibility to adapt 
quickly to market needs “Here we can, it’s easier to change those, because they are just… I 
think people think that plans are made to be changed”. Yet, if plans can changed quickly and 
there is no formal way to inform all organisational members of the change, sometimes people 
are less informed and not aware of the latest situation “So, if we can change plans very easily, 
I think it usually leads to a situation where all the people involved are not informed”. The 
high flexibility sometimes causes projects to be killed in the last minute, somewhere on the 
top it is not ratified and stopped without explanation – a phenomenon taken lightly by people 
with a long work history at the company but confusing for newer employees,  
“I think there is the difference between people who have been working for (case 
company B) a long time and those who haven’t, because e.g. me who haven’t I was 
very frustrated. Because it was a process that has been going on very long time 
and many people had done much work for it and then everything was just no-go. 
But people who had been here for longer time were like ok – that’s it. And I was 
like ‘ahh’, could somebody give me some kind of explanation but those who were 
here for longer were just like, okay, this happens”. 
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This last problem, the quick cancelling of ready-to-market products without further 
explanations causes problem (4) missing link between actions and strategy.  
 
Figure 13: Strategy implementation problems and potential solution, case company B 
  
Finding a solution to these problems is difficult because mostly this process seems to be 
working well and increasing the level of formalisation might at first sight seem to destroy a 
well-functioning process. However, by just adding two small, mandatory elements (#1) for 
project management value could be created. Firstly, updates and sudden changes to projects 
could be stated and written down in an easily accessible platform (e.g. via email to all 
participants or in the intranet or some project management software). Information sharing 
would be facilitated and confusion or misunderstandings might be avoided. Secondly, in that 
same forum, projects could be officially declared “killed”, including a brief message on why 
it has been killed – giving an explanation and therewith increasing the link between strategy 
and actions.   
Nevertheless, the introduction of such a system may the source to other, future problems. 
Therefore, case company B should consider how grave these issues are and whether it would 
be worth the risk of “disturbing” the current implementation process.      
 
#1 
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4.3 COMPANY C 
Case company C has not undergone large corporate restructuring, nor large changes in 
strategy or otherwise.  
As a diversified company with multiple divisions, the company operates in a matrix structure. 
There are three divisions (BAs), each of which operates in various geographic regions and 
each organised into various functions. In addition to these functions and regions, there are 
also several processes that run across each BA. The processes are different for every BA. On 
group-level there is a corporate strategy function has that acts as support to the divisions for 
strategy formation and as coordinating point for strategy implementation.  
 
 
 
4.3.1 STRATEGY AS DIRECTION 
Strategy in case company C is perceived as those areas that require improvement or 
development, as well as operational issues. However, it does not distinguish into whether 
these areas for change touch upon regular operations or only designated strategic projects. 
Strategy, thus, encompasses a wide range of operational and development issues, and is 
strongly influenced by the divisions’ external environments. Accordingly, each division has 
its own particular strategy and there is no strong corporate strategy, “group strategy has just 
been all together – gluing it all together and presenting the company as a group instead of 
like 3 individual BAs. It has really been focusing, all the work and efforts, have been focusing 
on the BAs”.  
Case company C gives very high level strategic objectives, like “growth” and 
“internationalisation”, for each of its divisions, presented through the use pictures and 
images. It is a mix of related or not so related items that, taken together, expresses where the 
company aims to go. However, this mix of strategy-parts may change from year-to-year and 
does not communicate a “universal goal” or vision as case company B does, but rather a 
collection of development ideas, “the latest strategy picture that I have seen concerning (our 
division) is eight different boxes with different issues”. While this strategy manages to give 
employees an approximate idea of what their work should achieve, they do not get any more 
precise “instructions”. Therefore, in every unit the strategy’s meaning is cascaded into its 
particular context, “we have chosen three topics from the big picture (…) That is the way how 
we support strategy, because our main, the main target of our team is to, insure that the 
quality is good (…) And that, quality, is not one of the topics in our strategy map. But it is our 
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normal actions that we should manage with these things”. Thus, strategy gives a certain 
direction guiding daily operations, as well as particular (corporate-wide) development items. 
In that way, it is more specific than case company B’s vision, but does not provide a detailed 
map of how to reach this destination, as case company D does.  
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 THE ANNUAL PLANNING-DRIVEN PROCESS 
The strategy implementation process at case company C is not highly formalised. There is a 
common schedule with key dates for all BAs, as well as a common communication kick-off 
and corporate-wide follow-up process for selected strategic projects, but no binding 
standardised process for all BAs. In consequence, the BAs have differing implementation 
processes, bound only loosely through shared deadlines and communication kick-off. Each 
BA may choose its own tools and implementation mode. Moreover, there is varying use of the 
corporate strategy department’s services and corporate prescriptions regarding this matter.  
This strategy implementation process also belongs to the Annual Planning-driven. Strategy 
implementation is integrated into the annual planning process, i.e. there is a clear sequencing 
starting from the communication of intended strategy as formulated by top management with 
following operationalisation through activity planning and project development. In the course 
of communicating strategy, top management and middle management cascade strategy to the 
levels below them – making them both implementers.  Yet, communication is not universally 
managed throughout the organisation and different division leaders can do it their own way. 
Strategy being implemented within divisions and this freedom in communicating strategy 
leads to a strong element of emergent strategy; Once intended strategy has been 
communicated top-down, annual action plans are created bottom- up. Here, is a chance for 
operative and middle management to take (neo-)strategic decisions and thereby actively 
contribute to formulating future strategy. A slightly stricter role ascription is the result of a 
more formalised annual planning process. Slightly different from other Annual Planning-
driven model applications, this one integrates a limited number of strategic initiatives into the 
planning. Strategic initiatives are planned and executed alongside operational business 
planning. A particular corporate project management program follows up on the development 
of some selected projects. 
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Figure 14: Strategy implementation process, case company C 
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4.3.3 STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS 
The big strength of this process lays in its adaptability to the divisions’ external business 
environment, “I think what’s really, what’s one strength in doing like how we are doing, so 
not focusing on the group side and putting it into the same format is that we are more 
sensitive to the actual needs of the business. So we are really doing it from the business 
perspective, not the company perspective”. Especially since the three divisions are facing 
rather diverse business environments it makes sense to be giving the freedom to the different 
departments to not only have their own strategy content, but also their own way of 
implementing it. Another strength is the freedom this loosely designed implementation 
process provides; employees can create their work around the strategic points they consider 
relevant. Employees can set their actions and tasks, after discussion and approval, themselves 
and can feel ownership of their tasks, “people need to think that they have contributed to the 
content as well”. Furthermore, they feel that their input is valued, “I feel that I can pick up 
those things that I feel are important for our team to achieve the company’s targets”.  
 
Process attributes 
 
Strategy        
content 
High-level strategy – gives direction, but leaves out the details. 
Division-specific: incl. operational business activities & particular projects  
Incl. development areas, but not development vehicle – many unconnected topics.   
 “I think that in recent years, they have been communicating the strategy, but quite 
on high level, as a said, as a vision, collection of different pictures illustrating that 
different things”, 
“they are in a very operational mode. They are thinking about different projects 
independently, but they have been lacking the kind of the umbrella, the kind of 
Road Map, that derives from the strategy.” 
“And that’s not enough I think to guide people to understand where to concentrate 
and what to do”  
“for (division A) our aim is to have maybe 5 clearly stated strategic initiatives” 
Sequence Initial strategy from top, then less clear sequencing 
 “So in that sense, the country-plans need to drive towards the BA-strategy. So, in 
that sense, it is also part of the planning, but it has a strong impact on the 
implementation. Absolutely.” 
Decision-types More (neo)strategic decisions on higher levels, but also possible on lower.  
 “So, besides this BA-level strategy we will have a country-level, we call them 
commercial plans, so more concrete, more listing the actual actions what to do.” 
Roles 
Top Management formation and “directing”, 
Middle Management as translators in implementation and formulators  
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 “So their (top management) commitment. I think that’s the critical part. Because if 
they are not delivering the message and setting the targets and directing their 
organisations, then anything we do from still from outside that, no matter how 
good our message is, (…), they would still be contradicting to what the day-to-day 
management would say or do” 
“the involvement of all already in the design formulation phase. But I think that is 
crucial. If you want to have your buy-in for the implementation, you need to 
already have some involvement and take the key persons already in design phase”,  
“So it is driven from the group level, owned in the businesses and then approved 
like one step up” 
Conclusion Each division pursues its own strategy closely bound to the external 
environment. Each division has its own process; they are only bound 
through shared deadlines. Varying degrees of emergent strategy.   
 
 
 
 
4.3.4 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
In case company C, eleven individual problems have been identified. Assessing these eleven 
for their cause, six main sources of problems have been found. Some of these are common 
throughout all the case companies, as for example the everlasting issue of resource scarcity, 
but others are more closely tied to this implementation process in particular.  
Source of Problem Implementation problem observed 
(1) Resource Scarcity 
1. Communication requires time  
2. Too many projects 
(2) Missing Link between 
strategy an actions 
3. Missing Link between strategy and actions 
4. Unclear expectations (targets) 
(3) Unaligned target setting 
5. Unaligned target setting 
6. Roles not clear – ownership issues 
7. Competing goals 
(4) Unaligned resource 
allocation 
8. Unaligned resource allocation 
9. Roles do not match decision rights and 
responsibilities 
(5) Joint project management 
10. Getting all the people together to discuss 
the projects 
(6) Too abstract strategy 11. Too abstract strategy 
Table 13: Strategy implementation problems and sources of problems, case company C 
Case company C’s biggest challenges are project portfolio coordination and cross-functional 
cooperation. Pursuing problem sources (1) through (5) for their ultimate effect, they all 
Table 12: Strategy implementation process attributes, case company C 
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inhibit cooperation across departments and functions.  
(1) Resource scarcity in case company C is mostly demonstrated through the difficulties of 
finding the way to communicate the strategy without spending too much time and yet making 
sure the message arrives and is understood as intended, “Because it has to do a lot with 
communication and it’s not easy to deliver messages when everybody are of course busy with 
their work and you can’t gather everyone together and spend hours of their time”. As in any 
other case company, resource scarcity is also shown in the fact that there are too many 
projects, “Because there are quite a few. Like dozens of different projects”. Therefore, 
prioritisation of strategic goals, and subsequently of projects, is important. 
 “So much that people don’t actually even know what’s the actual, overall project 
portfolio guideline. So, … it needs to be highlighted that these are the most 
important things. These are the ones we will spend the most time on, we have the 
money and resources for, and then there might be some other things but the most 
important things should be with priority1-tag. And, … in the road map”.  
 
This is closely related to the problem that there seems to be a (2) missing link between 
actions and strategy. There are so many projects ongoing, many of which display strong signs 
of emergent strategy, and they are all somehow related to the strategy, but they are not 
connected in view to the division’s overall strategy, “because somehow I have a feeling that 
they are in a very operational mode. They are thinking about different projects independently, 
but they have been lacking the kind of the umbrella, the kind of Road Map, that derives from 
the strategy”. The missing link to intended strategy on a project selection and management 
scale is evident from this, but there is also a missing link on the individual level, “It’s not 
logical. There are some empty, empty fields that nobody has created a connection to the 
strategy. Doing something that I can’t see the connection to the strategy. And it’s not logical. 
I would do it differently in a way. The implementation if I had the power”. The prioritisation 
of strategic goals is thus not only meant to guide project selection, but also to provide a 
guideline for employees to be able to split their work when time is limited. When a strategy 
provides clear prioritisation of goals, it also sets clearer targets to employees and enables them 
to better cooperate, “so, in that sense, on a higher level the idea is to give people the 
understanding that if they have to prioritise their work, they know that this is something in the 
core of strategy and this is something to support. So, if I need to split my time, I know how to 
do it”. However, this prioritisation is currently not sufficiently well done on a general level.  
An associated problem is (3) unaligned target setting, which in its own rite creates unclear 
expectations and competing goals. “Each function has their own targets and they have 
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focused on these and nobody is looking (at) the whole process”. Action planning and target 
setting is done in functions, not in the newly introduced processes. The same is true for (4) 
resource allocation, “all the function leaders are keeping their resources in their own hands, 
and when the processes and activities in processes need resources you always have to fight 
for the resources”. As a result of planning within functions, but then operating through 
functions and processes, certain grey areas arise and people are not always entirely sure what 
exactly their role is, “This is a little bit unclear, for our people what the responsibility is, their 
own and the other people’s. So that I think we should be better in this, to describe the 
responsibilities. Maybe we can describe them, but we are not living like the descriptions are”. 
This lacking alignment of new processes with “traditional” ways of allocating targets, 
resources and responsibilities creates a source for lacking cooperation. Instead of uniting 
interests around common goals, functions are incentivised to pursue their individual goals. 
Targets, or individual goals, are not sufficiently harmonised, “now we have separate targets, 
every function has separate targets and nobody connects targets to key processes”, for 
successful cooperation.  
Moreover, there seems to be an issue with getting all the key people together for a (5) joint 
project management. This problem has been tackled with the corporate project portfolio 
governance program, the effect of which is to be seen, “But we have been trying to find out 
what’s the right way to govern the whole process or portfolio and it seems that (it is) quite a 
complex task to get all the people into the same room, have a real discussion about all the 
projects”.   
Another issue is the feeling among employees that (6) strategy is too abstract. The high-level 
communication gives a direction, but not very precisely so and some of the office employees 
feel that a clearer set of “instructions” might be useful, 
“I think, management team should give us a little bit more details in our action 
plans. Like I started to tell you, we have those big topics like growth and 
profitability, where is both a lot of things to do, so, so, some advices where to focus 
this year. So that they give us too much freedom to choice, to choose those targets 
what to do and I think it should be more … detailed, the targets.” 
This lacking level of detail, or translation of abstract strategy into practical actions, shows one 
of the core problems. As one interviewee said, 
“on a higher level the idea is to give people the understanding that if they have to 
prioritise their work, they know that this is something in the core of strategy and 
this is something to support. So, if I need to split my time, I know how to do it. But I 
think this is a high-level thinking that doesn’t, maybe it works for couple levels but 
of course it doesn’t work that way for everybody in every country. So, besides this 
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BA-level strategy we will have a country-level, we call them commercial plans, so 
more concrete, more listing the actual actions what to do. So splitting it up a bit 
and making it more concrete. And I think that will guide the actual work better”,  
abstract strategies are translated into operational tasks as part of the annual planning process. 
However, the initial connection between these tasks and the original, more abstract, strategy 
depends on each individual’s own environment – for some it is better translated, for others 
worse.  The high level of abstraction in the intended strategy induces emergent strategy. This 
in turn requires employees, i.e. implementers, to formulate their own emergent strategy. In 
consequence, there is a lack of clarity in the strategy which contributes to the misaligned 
project selection and management, as implemented emergent strategy is initially unaligned.  
 
Figure 15: Strategy implementation problems and potential solutions, case company C 
Solutions for the strategy implementation problems in case company C can be found in a (#1) 
more defined strategy or more elaborate communication of the divisions’ strategies. The 
“umbrella” under which projects are chosen, i.e. the strategy, could be more defined and 
communicated. For this, strategy need not necessarily be put into more details, but annual 
plans and strategic projects should be created and selected in a way that connects them more 
to the intended strategy. Moreover, these problems can be tackled by a (#2) more integrated 
target setting and resource allocation process after projects and operative actions have been 
chosen. In particular, processes should be given more attention in order to avoid competing 
goals, “if you think about bonus targets, they are all set, they are coming from function 
targets, not from process targets. So what do you think people are doing?”, and the 
introduction of group targets, as in case company B, could be considered. 
 
 
#1 
#2 
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4.4 COMPANY D  
Case company D has recently undergone a major reorganisation as result of M&A-activity. In 
the course of this restructuring, the entire organisational structure and processes have been 
redesigned and a new strategy implementation process has been instated.  
The case company operates in a matrix structure, it is organised into various divisions, called 
Business Lines (BL). These divisions interact with several geographical areas, called Business 
Areas (BA) and some shared corporate functions such as Finance. Moreover, the company has 
a corporate strategy function which supports strategy formation and facilitates the strategy 
implementation process.   
 
4.4.1 STRATEGY AS CHANGE 
Strategy in case company D is perceived as those areas of corporate performance or 
development where change or improvement is needed, “Because with strategic initiatives we 
are trying to make a change”. Under this perception, strategy is not stable, but always 
signifies areas for change. Strategy encompasses those areas upon which focus must be put. 
As such, regular employees’ work does not fall into the category of strategy implementation, 
but only the work on issues identified as “strategic”. “So, there you need to kind of remember 
that there are kind of ongoing, how to say it, normal operational things, that need to be done. 
But then there are some things where we need to increase attention and focus and make some 
changes, then we may give a push to those things, but we still keep on doing the normal 
things”. These strategic issues touch issues that are of universal importance for all, thus, 
despite the company being active in various geographic areas and divisions, there is one 
strategy for the whole organisation. In addition to that there might be a more detailed lower 
level strategy, but this one would then need to fit under the higher level strategy.   
Accordingly, employees working on strategy implementation have quite an informed view of 
strategy. They are aware of the specific areas where change is desired and towards which 
strategy is geared, “the strategy defines the, a … bit higher level decisions where to go and 
how to do it, and then the kind of… how to say it… where to focus”. Strategy consists of 
various elements, strategic objectives, in form of must-wins. These are readily defined during 
the initial formation phase and when implementation starts, with strategy communication, it is 
channelled through these pre-defined elements. Strategy is cascaded through the organisation 
by means of projects and actions, making it thus, very actionable, “what would be good for 
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the strategy is that there is a simple, and easy to implement and also straight forward. That is 
my own view”. For the (participating) individual, strategy becomes very tangible.  
“It is not just some fancy words, some fancy words on the corporate level and nice 
story, but it is really going to the actions and I would say if you look at the BL 
management or BU management teams and their teams, I think it is quite many 
players down from the corporate level that people are really implementing the 
actions that are kind of related to the strategy and the strategic objectives” 
 
 
 
4.4.2 THE INITIATIVE-DRIVEN PROCESS 
The strategy implementation process is highly formalised; the company uses one process with 
the same timeline, support material, templates and tools for all divisions and functions. This 
process is owned and supported by the corporate strategy function. Accordingly, the 
implementation process in any part of the company is the same as that in any other part of the 
company.  
The process corresponds to the initiative-driven model. As such, strategy is not perceived as 
touching people’s everyday work, but only those selected projects corresponding to the top-
down communicated pre-formulated strategy. There is clear starting point for the process – 
top management’s intended strategy. Strategy is thus seen as mostly deliberate, hence there is 
a clear distinction between roles of top management to formulate strategy and to subsequently 
implement it in cooperation with middle management, “I think even there the information is 
coming very much bottom-up. And then based on the bottom-up information we consolidate it 
to the (corporate)-wide strategy, and then the executive may then decide on some changes to 
the must-wins, the must-win objectives. And those are again, based on the bottom-up input 
then it is kind of given back, top-down”. Hence, information is gathered bottom-up for 
strategy formation and implementation, starting with communication, has a clear top-down 
direction with clear directives on which kind of actions to choose. Furthermore, this indicates 
a clear sequencing with formation initially preceding implementation. Decisions taken as part 
of implementation are mostly limited to tactical and operational decisions, limiting the room 
for emergent strategy, i.e. autonomous strategic behaviour, to occur. “The implementation is 
done through the must-wins. Those 4 must-wins, we have different levels of initiatives and 
action-plans”, where the must-wins are communicated top-down and the initiatives, and the 
action plans they are made of, have to correspond to one of these must-wins, “and then the 
actions are defined in the lower levels. So both, the actions when they define them the first 
time but then also during the year the corrective actions“.  
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Since strategy implementation is seen as very deliberate in case company D there is a need for 
greater corporate control in order to achieve alignment of initiatives and actions. This 
demonstrates the great strength of this implementation process. 
 
Process attributes 
 
Strategy        
content 
Detailed strategy – gives clear must-win areas and must-win objectives. 
Corporate-wide strategy focusing on areas for change/improvement. 
Strategy content highly aligned 
  “It (guidance) is, it comes from the structure – so that we have the must-wins, the 
must-win objectives and then the initiatives in the BLs and areas, they need to be 
linked to the objectives. So that is giving the high-level guidance” 
Sequence Initial strategy from top, then clear sequencing with few (neo)strategic 
decisions as part of implementation. 
 “I suppose that as the initiatives are more or less given – these are the ones we 
need to achieve”, 
“each team, each manager with some subordinates will then have a team 
discussion, usually part of their regular monthly meeting, or whatever – then they 
will discuss about the strategy, to discuss about what does the strategy mean to us, 
to our team, to everybody in this team and what are the key actions to implement 
the strategy and meet the objectives.” 
Decision-types Most (neo)strategic decisions on top management level, very few below  
 “But this, kind of, those calls are made in the lower level, and of course, if 
somebody in the lower level thinks that this is impossible to do both then the new 
initiative, he needs to raise it up to the boss. That needs to come bottom-up to kind 
of, if we need to prioritize things and can’t do all the things that we want to do”,  
“the action under each of the initiatives are then of course very much area and 
business specific actions – how do we get there” 
Roles Top Management formulates and “directs”, 
Middle Management are implementers  
 “I think even there the information is coming very much bottom-up. And then 
based on the bottom-up information we consolidate it to the (corporate)-wide 
strategy, and then the executive may then decide on some changes to the must-
wins, the must-win objectives. And those are again, based on the bottom-up input, 
then it is kind of given back up, top-down” 
Conclusion There is one strategy that applies to the whole corporation. This strategy is 
implemented through a particular implementation process separate from, 
but parallel to, the annual planning process. Strong corporate control; 
deliberate strategy is strong, while emergent is limited by the high level of 
detail of the intended strategy    
Table 14: Strategy implementation process attributes, case company D 
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Board of Directors
Strategies presented 
and approved
Executive Team
Summary of Analyses 
and Discussions
Present and 
discuss Summaries 
for approval
BL & BA           
Management Teams
Analysis & Strategy 
Discussion
Action plans for 
MW-Initiatives, 
organised under 
MW-Objectives
Action plans are 
entered into ARC 
(software for                         
follow-up)
BU & Regions 
Management Teams
Analysis & Strategy 
Discussion
Discussion: 
What does it 
mean for us?
Action plans for 
MW-Initiatives, 
organised under 
MW-Objectives
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Discussion: 
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mean for us?
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MW-Initiatives, 
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MW-Objectives
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March to May
Strategy Days                             
50-60 Top Managers 
to present and 
discuss BL and BA 
strategies
Strategy formulation                                                                                                                                        
(Corporate Strategy-led)
"Townhall"-
meetings to 
present strategy 
to all  employees 
in all  locations 
(Office units, 
factories, etc) 
September to October November / December Ongoing
Strategic Planning 
(Corporate Strategy-led)
Communication                                        
(Corporate Communications-led)
Schedule, Templated, Guidelines provided Material in local language provided Schedule, Templated, Guidelines 
provided
Follow-Up                                     
(Initiative-owner-led)
Monthly in unit, Quarterly with 
corporate strategy dpt.
 
Figure 16: Strategy implementation process, case company D 
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4.4.3 STRENGTHS OF THE PROCESS 
Case company D’s strategy implementation process shows three large strengths; clear 
cascading of tasks and roles through precise action planning, detailed follow-up and a high 
level of corporate control for a stronger alignment of strategic initiatives.  
The adoption of the must-win concept and the initiative-based implementation process has 
enabled case company D to create clear roles and responsibilities for strategy implementation 
through action planning, “And the framework itself is well organised and I don’t know from 
which company we have adopted this, but the framework itself is quite ok and the concept of 
must-win is also quite good”. Each strategic action belongs to one action plan, each action 
plan belongs to one must-win initiative, and each must-win initiative ultimately serves one 
must-win objective. Within the action planning, one action or initiative owner is designated 
and his role, tasks, targets and timeline is defined, creating accountability, “(it is clearly 
visible who is) the owner and responsible of different initiatives, and within each initiative 
there is the action plan and then each action also has responsible. So that is very visible, who 
is responsible for what action”. Furthermore, the implementers are also participating 
themselves in creating action plans which creates strong commitment and ownership, “and 
those action plans usually involve middle managers who have a direct impact on the... 
sometimes on the shaft-floor level”. Moreover, the inclusion of implementers in action 
planning helps to make sure that all actions decided upon actually correspond to existing 
business needs. Hence, implementers recognise the need for the action’s implementation and 
are more willing to put their time to the actions’ accomplishment, “the crucial thing is that it 
has to be related to everybody’s daily work, so it helps them to achieve their own targets”. 
This fosters collaboration and will to cooperate across business units and regions.  
This precise action planning and allocating of responsibilities enables also the high quality 
follow-up in case company D. In particular the use of the ARC software tool has increased the 
quality, “the whole must-win processes is documented in the ARC tool, which allows you to 
share responsibility of the initiatives and on the action-level you can define the 
responsibilities and the targets”, and comfort of strategy implementation in terms of speed, 
“we can just open those materials in the ARC systems, and check… that is one way to 
monitor”, and ease of use, “ARC is there, this helps, so you don’t need to play with the 
powerpoints and different colours and different numbers and these things”. “It is faster, there 
is a good visibility of the targets and actions, and… I guess that the big issue is that there are 
clear targets now in different organisation and everyone sees the connection of the actions, 
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which has not been always the case”. Thus, managers can quickly access the system and 
check the status of an initiative or action. In addition to regular follow-up meetings, “the 
follow up is done through this specific tool ARC, and follow-up meetings for those must-win 
implementation status”, this documentation can be used to make collaboration easier, share 
information on project progress more quickly and guide implementers in their daily work.  
Since strategy is so strongly deliberate at case company D it is not surprising that the third 
strength of the process is its high level and well-functioning corporate control.  The corporate 
head office gives clear guidance not only on content of strategic actions, but also on the 
timeline, templates, tools and communication, “But we give the overall guidance, schedule 
guidance and templates for the BLs and BAs”. While still leaving much room for 
implementers to participate in formulating the details of action planning, the way how it is 
done is clearly prescribed. This leads to a strong alignment of the strategic initiatives and all 
employees are aware of the intended effect of each one of their strategic actions. This is 
enabled by quarterly follow-up meetings with the corporate strategy functions on the highest 
level developments, “the teams themselves are controlling the process, and then we report 
them (to corporate) in our must-wins monthly or quarterly”, in addition to the more frequent 
lower level follow-up, “I would say that more than 90% of the things that are not on track 
are noticed then in the BLs and areas and they find ways to correct it, how to… kind of make 
the implementation faster or that they may notice, these are not the right actions and that we 
may need to change some of the actions that we do to get to the results. So the corrective 
actions are being noticed”. However, despite a stronger corporate control than in other 
companies, not all actions can be followed-up by corporate,  
“So that there is, it is impossible to control everything from the corporation, 
so it is… even if using the tool, all the possible tools, the best tools in the 
world, it still leaves lots of room for individuals to do things. Otherwise to 
be able to follow up things, that you really know what is happening in each 
initiative and action in an organization like us, having more than 10.000 
employees and maybe in the ARC system we have 1.500 actions, then it is 
not just that somebody can do it with their other tasks”. 
 
4.4.4 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED 
Case company D encountered five problems. Yet, a closer look at their source reveals that 
there are only two sources for these problems; resource scarcity and the high level of 
formalisation. 
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Source of Problem Implementation problems observed 
(1) Resource Scarcity 
1. Resource scarcity 
2. Too many projects 
3. Always postponing initiatives 
4. Resistance to cooperate 
(2) Formalised process 5. Corporate control and update reporting 
Table 15: Strategy implementation problems and sources of problems, case company D 
The biggest challenge in case company D is a too wide selection of strategic initiatives. 
While the process itself works reasonably well, the only difficulties are found in the selecting 
the most important issues and channelling these through a more selective group of strategic 
initiatives.  
(1) Resource scarcity manifests itself in three ways at case company; too many projects, an 
ongoing postponing of initiatives and a resistance to cooperate. However, the company seems 
to have effective measures in use to deal with them. All the symptomatic problems associated 
with resource scarcity are closely related. When there are limited resources a company needs 
to select those activities that best suit its goals in order to make sure that the selected activities 
have sufficient funds to be properly executed, “that’s why I said that having too many 
initiatives might become a big problem, because not necessarily we have all those resources 
to implement those things”. In case a company pursues too many activities at the same time 
none of them might be finished to its full potential, “if you want to achieve too many things at 
the same time you have too many action plans. And that could become a big problem” and it 
seems this might already be the case at case company D “And as always, I guess that 
probably we have too many actions there on the list – I don’t know if the initiative is correct 
or should we try to reduce that one as well. But, plenty of actions and activities ongoing”. 
This very fact also causes the third issue, always postponing initiatives, “That is the reason 
why the initiatives are not moving forward is that there are not enough resources for it. It can 
be, or I am sure that it actually is common, that somebody who should be, who is responsible 
of some important change that we should do doesn’t have enough time for that because of so 
many other tasks”. If this is then the case, that people do not have enough time to do their 
own tasks, they are less likely to be willing to help others with their tasks. “And if the others 
are not willing to invest time”, this then poses the risk of impeding cooperation.  
The other challenge is the (2) high level of formalisation of the implementation process. 
While this is also the biggest strength of case company D’s process, it is the source of some 
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organisational inefficiencies. The need to adhere to corporate standards by filling out certain 
templates within certain timelines as dictated by the corporate strategy functions costs time, 
“But sometimes it also hinders the work, because there are formalities you have to fulfil” and 
increases the workload of initiative and action owners “if there is a certain format that you 
have to fulfil every now and then it gives you a workload”. Yet, when asked whether this 
additional work for alignment is more of a nuisance than the formalised process is a help, the 
interviewee clearly stated that the processes benefits outweigh their costs, “Having second 
thought, I think it is better to have a framework – I wouldn’t say it is hindering the work”.   
One problem not found in the interviews but nonetheless potentially existing is the effect of 
this mainly deliberate strategy-driven implementation process. Since all strategic initiatives 
and actions need to correspond to one of the must-win objectives and must-win initiative as 
given in the intended strategy, “So to think about or device some appropriate action plans for 
the specific initiatives requires quite a lot of discussion, brainstorming and analysis to come 
up with precise action plans”, major autonomous strategic behaviour might be prevented and 
the company might be missing out on great opportunities for change and development. With 
this process, it is necessary that top management listens very closely to line managers and 
lower level ideas in order to make sure that potential autonomous strategic behaviour that is 
suppressed in the implementation process can occur in the initial formation phase, “Well, 
from the top comes the main must-win topics, then there is the initiative under each of the 
must-wins; my understanding is that there is an integration of different opinions, proposals 
from the areas and BLs”.  
 
Figure 17: Strategy implementation problems and potential solutions, case company D 
  
#1 #2 
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The solution to these problems can be found in a more strict selection of projects. The 
different must-win objectives and initiatives as given from the top management’s 
communicated intended strategy might be even more adjusted to the different divisions and 
the most important eight out twelve initiatives could be chosen to reduce the (#1) number of 
projects. This way, resources, in particular implementers’ time, could be allocated more 
effectively and the individual actions and initiatives might bear more fruits earlier. The time 
that would become available through this measure could prevent the (#2) resistance to 
cooperate, which is currently triggered exclusively through lack of time. Further, one of the 
interviewees mentioned the fact that the more each individual action is helpful to every 
organisational member, the greater each individual’s willingness to help and cooperate is, 
“the crucial thing is that it (the strategic initiative or action) has to be related to everybody’s 
daily work, so it helps them to achieve their own targets”. For this, employees need to 
understand not only their own problems but also those of others, and all have to have a 
common goal. Therefore, the two-way information flow during the initial formation phase is 
crucial in making sure strategy takes care of actual organisational needs. Moreover, the 
subsequent communication process needs to guarantee that all employees get the same 
understanding of what is the strategy and why it is like that, “so everybody sees the same 
ball...”, and the strategic planning phase during implementation needs to be inclusive inviting 
concerned individuals to channel their own actions towards this end, “... and we are playing 
the same ball game”.  
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5. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
Comparing the overall performance of the four strategy implementation processes, there are 
two processes that show fewer and less severe problems than the other two processes; the two 
“most pure” processes. In table 16 severe problems are marked in dark red, while less severe 
or potential problems are marked in light red.  
Company B Company A Company C Company D
Lack of buy-in  -  -  -  -
Capabilities of employees insuff icient  -  -  -  -
Bad strategy  -  -  -  -
Too abstract strategy  -  -  +  -
Disconnection betw een formulators and 
implementors
 -  -  +  -
Previously unidentif ied problems  -  -  -  -
Missing Model for implementation  -  -  -  -
Informal process leads                                                       
to less info sharing
 -  +  -  -
Missing link between strategy and actions  +  -  +  -
Varying implementation quality  +  -  -  -
Lacking transparency  +  -  -  -
Ineffective communication  -  -  -  -
   Communication requires time  +  -  +  -
People are less informed  ++  -  -  -
Responsibilities insuff iciently defined  -  -  -  -
Roles not clear  -  -  ++  -
Lack of Resources  -  ++  - +
Too high workload  -  ++  - +
Too many projects  +  +  +  +
Having to end projects                                                    
before they are finished
 -  +  -  -
Overall goals not understood  -  -  -  -
Lack of Accountability  -  -  -  -
Rew ard Systems not in line w ith strategy  -  -  -  -
Unclear expectations (targets)  -  -  ++  -
Conflicting inidividual goals  -  -  +  -
Lacking w ill to cooperate  -  -  -  -
    Resistance to cooperate  -  ++  -  +
Insufficient Coordination  -  -  +  -
Unaligned target setting  -  ++  ++  -
Decision rights do not match responsibilities  +  -  +  -
Unaligned resource allocation  -  -  ++  -
Competing activities and crises  -  -  -  -
More time than expected  -  -  -  +
Always postponing projects  +
New Inability to cut projects  +  +  -  -
Purely 
Annual 
Planning
Mixed Mixed
Purely 
Initiative
F
ro
m
 L
it
e
ra
tu
re
 R
e
v
ie
w
 
Table 16: Strategy implementation problems, all case companies 
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From table 16 one can see that each strategy implementation process has its own strategy 
implementation problems. These problems can be approached in two ways; by looking at the 
strategy content and by looking at the implementation process design. This is a reasonable 
approach because those two parameters determine the “extreme” ends of a continuum along 
which all strategy implementation processes can be drawn. 
  
5.1 COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE PERCEPTION OF 
STRATEGY FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
However, first, one step back needs to be taken. When comparing the companies’ differing 
views on what constitutes strategy formation and its implementation and how they are 
managed, the first issue that became evident were two questions about the delimitations of the 
strategy process: firstly, where does formation end and implementation begin, and, secondly, 
where does implementation end and operational management begin? While the first question 
can be readily answered with the help of this thesis’ literature review, the second one needs 
some analysis. Interestingly, questions about strategy formation have been answered more 
clearly and uniformly also by the case companies, while questions about strategy 
implementation have been answered more diversely and contradictory. Therefore, this study 
itself demonstrates and further proves this well-known problem of strategy implementation; 
its high level of ambiguity.  
 
5.1.1 CLEAR ROLES AND SEQUENCING FOR DELIBERATE 
STRATEGY 
Initially, strategy formation ends with top management’s first attempt at communicating it. 
Definition point #5 from the literature review states that all implementation starts from a pre-
conceived goal (Li et al., 2008) and all case companies agree on this point. Moreover, all case 
companies agree that intended strategy is made by top management. This point in particular 
shows that when referring to strategy implementation, most companies have deliberate 
strategy in mind, and deliberate strategy is always preceded by intended strategy formation. 
While the subsequent phase of implementation might include large elements of formation, i.e. 
strategic or neo-strategic decisions as part of strategic or annual planning, it is still part of the 
implementation phase because it aims to operationalise the communicated intended strategy. 
This communicated intended strategy triggers induced strategic behaviour, i.e. deliberate 
strategy. Another point on which all case companies agree is the importance of bottom-up 
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information for this intended strategy formation process, making all organisational members 
below top management collaborators to strategy formation, but not necessarily themselves 
formulators of intended strategy. Thus, this strengthens the clear division of roles in deliberate 
strategy, a fact also described in Floyd and Lane’s (2000) competence deployment 
subprocess.  
Shared 
assumption 
Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Initially strategy 
formation 
precedes 
implementation 
My BA’s strategic 
objective is clearly to 
double the turnover in 
Finland and then the 
strategic dimension is 
to work profitably 
So the strategy acts as basis 
for the annual planning 
process 
... top management 
commitment is one of the key 
elements. So that they 
commit really to give the 
message… and communicate 
to their organisations 
We have the must-
wins, the must-win 
objectives and then 
the initiatives in the 
BLs and areas, they 
need to be linked to 
the objectives 
Intended strategy 
is created by top 
management or 
CEO 
It’s integrated to a 
board of directors’ 
annual check. So e.g. 
the next meeting in 
May, strategy is 
number 1 on agenda.  
Basically, the CEO is 
responsible for the content. 
And he’s very interested 
about it. But in the executive 
board we go and discuss very 
deeply 
It (strategy) is mainly done 
by management team 
The guidance and 
the framework is 
given Top-down. 
Lower levels 
provide 
information as 
input to initial 
strategy 
formation 
People are putting the 
input, I am talking 
about the middle 
management, like the 
guy you just met, they 
are actually in charge 
of the actions. Because 
they know the reality 
better than the 
manager. 
By very deep discussions 
about the external 
environment, internal picture 
of the company and of course 
anyone has, from each 
function of the different 
members of the board, 
knowledge of some specific 
things he or she wants to 
discuss, would like to include 
it in the strategy. 
I (…) give input from the 
field (…), how are things 
implemented in (Point of 
Sale). And then I collect the 
information once a year (…), 
that we have made during 
the year and they use this 
information when they start 
the strategy process doing 
this analyses.  
I think even there the 
information is 
coming very much 
bottom-up. And then 
based on the bottom-
up information we 
consolidate it to the 
(corporate)-wide 
strategy 
Table 17: Case companies’ shared perceptions of strategy formation 
 
 
5.1.2 LESS AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE AND 
EMERGENT STRATEGY 
However, the second question is more complicated; it is not as readily answered by the 
literature and the case companies do not share a common understanding. Is strategy only 
change or is everything a company does part of its strategy? The answer to this question 
strongly depends on each company’s own understanding of what strategy is and how it is 
made. Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) express this by pointing out the various perspectives 
managers may take and the “strategy school” they adopt for their organisation’s strategy 
work. Further, is strategy implementation equal to operational management? This question is 
tightly linked these “perspectives” on strategy, i.e. the purpose and content of strategy within 
a given company, and has a strong influence on the strategy implementation process chosen.  
Table 18 shows the four strategy implementation processes found in the four case companies 
with their assumptions about what constitutes strategy and process components.  
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 Company A Company B Company C Company D 
Strategy     
Level of detail Direction and set 
objectives 
Vision Direction and 
set objectives 
Set objectives 
Operational/                   
only Strategic 
Operational   and 
strategic 
Operational   is 
strategic 
Operational 
and strategic 
Strategic 
One strategy                             
for all divisions 
No Yes No Yes 
Initiative-driven  
    
Strategy consists                         
of action plans  
X   X 
Clear division                    
of roles 
  X X 
Strong               
sequencing 
   X 
Annual Planning-
driven 
    
Strategy is  oper-
ational planning  
 X X  
Less clear                    
role division 
X X   
Less clear          
sequencing 
X X X 
 
Strengths 
(supporting quotes          
 see chapter 4) 
Cascaded meaning 
of strategy 
Flexibility 
Ongoing strategy 
process 
Freedom 
Cooperation 
Employee 
engagement 
Freedom 
Adaptability 
Cascading meaning 
of strategy 
Follow-up 
Corporate control 
Weaknesses 
(supporting quotes          
 see chapter 4) 
High workload Limiting the 
project portfolio 
Lacking 
transparency 
Coordination 
Project 
portfolio 
management 
Limiting the 
project portfolio 
Table 18: Four strategy implementation processes with their strengths and weaknesses 
In the following, both, the strategy content’s and the strategy implementation process type’s 
effect on strategy implementation problems, will be assessed. 
 
 
5.2 STRATEGY CONTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 
Taking a look at the empirical findings from the case companies it shows that two of the 
companies with least implementation problems have both a very clear understanding of what 
strategy means to them. Both have a very different perception from one another, but the 
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important point is that their respective views are clear and shared throughout the organisation. 
All employees within the company know what their company’s strategy is, thus, they know 
what is expected from them and how their actions feed into the implementation of strategy. 
Case company B sees strategy as a high-level vision guiding all activities of the company, 
including all operational tasks. Hence, implementation is seen as very closely related to 
operational management and all employees hold an implementing position. Case company D 
sees strategy as only defined areas for change, translated into particular actions for selected 
implementers. Thus, there is a clear distinction between strategic issues and operational 
management, making strategy implementation a task of few rather than a task for all.   
Company B Company C Company A Company D
Too abstract strategy  -  +  -  -
Missing link between 
strategy and actions
 +
 +
 -  -
   Communication requires 
time
 +  +  -  -
Roles not clear  -  ++  -  -
Conflicting inidividual goals  -  +  -  -
    Resistance to cooperate  -  -  ++  +
Unclear expectations 
(targets)
 -  ++  -  -
Vision only
Direction through 
high-level items
Direction and 
selected detailed 
items
Selected and 
detailed change 
items only
 
Table 19: Strategy content related implementation problems, all case companies 
 
Case companies A and C are in between the two; strategy is less all-encircling than a vision 
but gives only a vague direction through certain year-to-year changing high-level items to 
case company C and a general direction with clear strategic change points to case company A. 
While every employee implements strategy to come extent, the ones involved in these 
strategic projects hold a somehow special position for strategy implementation. However, 
both case companies consider also operational issues to be strategic. So strategy includes 
operational issues, but also integrates certain strategic change, or improvement, projects. 
These cannot be considered equal to strategic initiatives in the same sense as in case company 
D because they are not the sole pillars of strategy but rather as additional areas of special 
focus. 
Companies that have only a vision as strategy, provided that it is successfully communicated 
and shared throughout the organisation, manage to create a shared goal among all its 
organisational members. Simplicity in the message in operational-content strategies is even 
 
 
Lacking Clarity 
 
 85 
 
more important than in initiative-content strategies, because the vision needs to be understood 
by all organisational members, not only some selected implementers. When strategy is a 
vision, employees have a relatively higher degree of freedom in formulating the strategy that 
defines their work. Goals are not yet broken down for them individually, but will be created 
as part of the business strategy, i.e. divisions’ operational planning. This fosters cooperation 
and willingness to cooperate as potentially conflicting goals are addressed right away and thus 
as best is possible avoided. However, on the flipside of this strength, not discussed in the 
literature, is this approach’s weakness; not all activities or decisions taken in the organisation 
are always seen as linked to the strategy and a clear structure might be missing. Because 
instructions from strategy are limited, a wide array of activities is possible and the 
responsibility of choosing the right path lies with the division – there is strong emergent 
strategy. This leads to the fact that sometimes, not all activities always seem connected and 
alignment might be weak as implemented emergent strategy only becomes formalised as 
intended strategy in subsequent strategy cycles. However, stronger alignment would be 
detrimental to the desired effects. This can be seen in case company B; the company thrives 
under its high employee engagement and renewal from within. Limiting employees’ freedom 
to try new projects might cause projects not to stray so far anymore, but the potential for new 
product innovations and employee-driven change might also be curbed this way.  
Companies that have only a few selected strategic initiatives as strategy, provided that they 
are successfully cascaded through strategic planning and systematically followed-up in the 
implementation process, manage to translate strategic objectives into tangible individual goals 
for implementers. Thus, they are making strategy highly tangible to these implementers and 
implementers can easily link their actions to the strategy. However, cooperation becomes 
more difficult. As goals are cascaded to the individual-level the risk of competing goals or 
“this is not my job”-attitude, especially in times of limited resources, increases, leading to a 
resistance to cooperate. This problem group has been found in case companies C and D. Also, 
employees might feel less inclined to think “outside the box” – deliberate strategy tells them 
what to do, why reach further? Furthermore, an issue not observed in the case companies but 
nonetheless likely to occur is a disconnection to strategy among non-implementers. While 
strategic initiatives might include operational issues, not all operational activities in a 
company are considered to be part of or drive strategy. Therefore, non-implementers might 
not feel ownership of or entirely understand the company’s strategy.   
Companies in between these two extremes encounter more problems. The pure vision-
approach and the pure initiative-approach, if managed right, both convey a clear message to 
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those people they consider to be implementers. Implementers know what is expected of them 
and where their company aims to go. For employees of companies with neither a clear 
highest-level vision, nor precise objectives articulated through action plans, this is more 
difficult.  They are lacking the shared common goal driving cooperation in vision-driven 
companies, as well as the cascaded, detailed, individual tasks and goals in purely initiative-
driven companies. In consequence, in addition to having both the problems inherent to vision-
driven and initiative-driven companies, they also have problems related to their strategy-
structure; employees’ roles in relation to strategy and targets are not clear, and individual 
goals are not sufficiently coordinated so that they are competing, hence, further inhibiting 
cooperation. Also, when strategy is more precise than a vision but less precise than a set of 
actions, it might be difficult for employees to grasp what exactly strategy is and strategy itself 
might appear abstract and confusing instead of guiding their actions. Li et al. (2008) state in 
their definition of strategy implementation (definition point #6) that managers and employees 
aim to “achieve strategic objectives” (p.6), so if these strategic objectives are not clearly 
understood, implementation problems are likely to occur. Thus, this empirical study showed 
that when strategy is more precise and short-term than a vision, the closer it is defined in 
terms of activities, the more tangible it becomes for employees.  
 
 
5.3 THE STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
PROBLEMS  
The empirical findings also support a division of strategy implementation problems along the 
continuum of annual planning-driven and initiative-driven implementation problems. Each 
extreme end of the continuum shows less and less severe implementation problems than the 
approaches in the middle and, as was already the case for strategy content’s relation to 
implementation problems, each extreme has its own set of issues.  
The annual planning-driven process usually evolves more around what needs to be done every 
year in terms of content than around how it is done. It tends to be a planning exercise around 
budgets, sales planning and operations planning. Typically, it is done similarly every year. 
Hence, despite some degree of formalisation, there is a high degree of tacit knowledge and 
practices that dictate how annual planning is done. Integrating strategy implementation into 
this system of annual planning makes strategy implementation less formal, less organised than 
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if it were done in a separate process. Accordingly, strategy implementation is handled 
differently in different parts of the organisation leading to a varying quality of strategy 
implementation. Also, the lack of an official process particular to strategy implementation 
leads to less transparency about why a project has been ended and less sharing of information 
about changes in projects. All these problems can be classified as problems related to the 
informality of the implementation process and information sharing and are most easily found 
in annual planning-driven strategy implementation problems.  
 
 
Company B Company A Company C Company D
Disconnection betw een 
formulators and 
implementors
 -  -  +  -
Informal process  
Informal process leads                                                       
to less info sharing
 ++  +  -  -
Missing link between 
strategy and actions
 +  -
 +
 -
Varying implementation 
quality
 +  -  -  -
Lacking transparency  +  -  -  -
   Communication requires 
time / not always invested
 +  -  +  -
Resource Scarcity
Too high workload  -  ++  - +
Too many projects  +  +  +  +
Having to end projects                                                    
before they are finished
 -  +  -  -
Resistance to cooperate  -  ++  -  +
Insufficient 
Coordination
 -  -  +  -
Unaligned target setting  -  ++  ++  -
Decision rights do not 
match responsibilities
 +  -  +  -
Unclear expectations 
(targets)
 -  -  ++  -
Conflicting inidividual goals  -  -  +  -
Roles not clear  -  -  ++  -
Unaligned resource 
allocation
 -  -  ++  -
More time than expected  -  -  -  +
Always postponing 
projects
 -  -  -  +
Inability to cut projects  +  +  -  -
Only Annual 
Planning (AP)
AP informally 
integrating 
AP and separate 
but integrated 
Initiative-driven 
Strategic Planning 
 
Table 20: Strategy implementation process related implementation problems, all case companies 
Caused by 
lacking 
corporate 
infrastructure 
 
  
   
Coordination 
 
 
 
  
Coordination 
 
Limited 
information 
flow  
&  
Effects of 
informality 
on quality 
  
Alignment costs 
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Furthermore, problems of missing links between actions and strategy can be observed. This is 
due to the fact that strategy is implemented as part of operational planning. Operational 
planning is done in functions or divisions with business needs in mind. There is less corporate 
control and activity alignment, because too much alignment of operational issues is 
detrimental functions’ or divisions’ business. Hence, there is also a relatively high degree of 
emergent strategy as operational decisions drive strategy implementation – this emergent 
strategy will only retroactively be integrated into declared, intended strategy.  
The initiative-driven process has a separate process for strategy implementation in place. This 
strategy implementation process has its own timeline, structure and communication channels, 
as well as control mechanisms. Therefore, all “strategic” activities are aligned to the intended 
strategy and there are no missing links between actions and strategy. By designating the 
strategy as only those areas where change is needed and closely defining the desired change, 
top management creates a clear understanding of what strategy is to those people it considers 
to be implementers of said strategy. Then choosing this tightly formalised process and the 
must-win initiative ideology, each “strategic” action becomes highly visible and open for 
follow-up, all implementers know what they are aiming for, “So in terms of strategy 
communication this must-win process puts into perspective everyone’s activities. And then it 
is easier to relate to the whole strategy” (Interviewee case company D). In initiatives, as has 
been illustrated in section 5.2 all activities and targets are cascaded to the individual 
implementer-level. Therefore, the same problem, “resistance to cooperate”, is inherent to 
initiative-driven processes. However, another problem appears; the issue of alignment costs. 
Cascading all the strategic actions to the individual-level requires quite some corporate 
resources. Communication of intended strategy needs to be done in detail, strategic planning 
needs to be carried out in parallel to annual planning, the strategic planning process needs to 
be guided and coordinated, and follow-up needs to be managed. All these costs are necessary 
for the initiative-driven approach because of its inherent need for more corporate control and 
formalised processes. 
Both of these process-types, the annual planning- and the initiative-driven approach, manage 
to coordinate their strategy implementation because the process is clear to the involved 
employees. While each one of the two approaches has its advantages, each one also has its 
distinct drawbacks. The annual planning-driven approach shows strong signs for emergent 
strategy, tacit knowledge and bottom-up employee participation, the initiative-driven 
approach demonstrates strong signs for deliberate strategy, alignment and corporate control. 
Neither one shows large issues in strategy implementation and its seems that it is more a 
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choice of how a company wants to “live”, rather than one being inherently better than the 
other. However, both approaches are better than the approaches that have no clear strategy 
implementation process. Case companies A and C, both of which combine annual planning 
and strategic projects in strategy implementation, share some of the implementation problems 
encountered by the pure annual planning-driven and pure initiative-driven approaches. Yet, 
they also demonstrate an additional group of problems; lack of coordination. This lack of 
coordination, stemming from insufficient integration of two parallel processes, leads to 
competing interests and ultimately to resistance to cooperate. However, the degree of lacking 
coordination can vary. In case company A it is merely a lack of target alignment. Activities 
are planned and targets are set in functions with no coordination between functions so that the 
shared resources are being fought over. In case company C, in addition to this lacking target 
alignment, also roles and expectations are not entirely understood by all organisational 
members, making not only cooperation more difficult, but also the fulfilment of individual 
tasks. The two parallel processes are not only insufficiently integrated but also not clearly 
enough demarcated and understood. The severity of these problems is enhanced by the fact 
that there are various processes that run across functions and also require time and attention. 
While in annual planning driven-processes roles, responsibilities and targets are managed as 
part of the operational business, and in the initiative-driven processes they are managed as 
part of the strategic planning process, a clear structure as part of which they are managed is 
lacking in these mixed forms. This might be the case because processes’ and functions’ 
activities are not integrated (see case company C), or because strategy implementation as a 
whole is confined to single divisions or functions with few interactions among each other (see 
case company A). However, in both cases, the structure of the process is not entirely clear or 
there are parallel, non-aligned processes.  
It needs to be noted that some of the problems in case company C are related more to its 
current economic situation than its strategy implementation process. Most of the resource 
scarcity problems are tied to the fact that corporate services have been cut, leaving the 
remaining functions and positions with a higher workload. This decreases the level of 
attention that can be paid to strategy implementation, as purely supporting activities need to 
be carried out in addition to the tasks of a position’s job description.  
Further, the fact that in case company D the problems of “always postponing projects” and 
“projects take longer than expected” arise might be due to the fact that projects are followed-
up more tightly and, therefore, are more visible. Moreover, the implementation process at case 
company D is driven mostly by formal implementation planning, making these problems 
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seem more severe than in another company, driven by negotiation or cooperation, where this 
might just be taken as a fact not worth mentioning.  
 
 
5.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES 
AND THEIR EFFECT ON IMPLEMENTATION-RELATED PROBLEMS 
A strategy that consists of a vision only, considering all a company’s operational activities 
part of its strategy, is always implemented as part of a company’s annual planning process 
and a strategy that consists of only a set of initiatives, excluding all regular activities from the 
notion of strategy, is always implemented as part of a separate initiative process.   
 
 
Figure 18: Strategy content-process relationship in view of implementation problems 
 
This can be explained by the observation that the more distinctly strategic action is described 
in the intended strategy, the more distinctly it is implemented. This reflects Chandler’s (1962) 
findings that structures are built around a given strategy. Strategy that contains only a vision 
does not command distinct action, but allows employees to implement strategy as they see fit, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lacking Clarity 
Coordin
ation 
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as part of their daily work; all activities a company undertakes count as strategy 
implementation. Therefore, it must occur in operational planning, i.e. annual planning. Annual 
planning is done in functions or divisions, with limited corporate control. Thus, the structural 
context is loosely knit, relies heavily on culture and leaves much room for autonomous 
strategic behaviour. There is a strong emergent strategy element, driven by one shared goal – 
the shared culture and vision. On the other extreme, strategy consists of only selected and 
defined strategic initiatives. These need to be implemented separately from regular activities, 
because regular activities are not considered to be a part of strategy implementation. If they 
are managed separately from operational business and need to reflect only those few selected 
items of the initiatives, they also require stronger corporate control for alignment. Thus, the 
structural context is knit much tighter, leaving less room for autonomous strategic behaviour 
and building implementation on detailed planning. There is a strong deliberate element, 
driven by cascaded individual goals – programming as much of the intended strategy as 
possible. 
A vision cannot be implemented through initiatives without prior definition of the vision into 
more specific goals and initiatives. Neither can a strategy that consists of only initiatives be 
implemented as fully integrated part of the annual planning process because of the initiatives’ 
project management character. Initiatives might cover the optimisation of operational tasks in 
which case they could technically be integrated in the annual planning, but often they cover 
cross-functional issues that have to be implemented outside existing cooperation structures. 
Hence, integrating them into the annual planning is difficult because people don’t have 
experience in how to cooperate – special channels for coordination and cooperation need to be 
created. In addition, coordination of targets, bonuses and responsibilities happens in the 
annual planning, coordinating them in the same process also for strategic initiatives that cut 
these across annual planning structures is difficult. Moreover, there is a problem with the 
follow-up; if initiatives are part of the annual planning, tracking their progress as opposed to 
regular activities’ progress is difficult. Thus, strategies consisting of only strategic initiatives 
have to be implemented through a separated mechanism, either a separate but integrated, or an 
entirely separate but parallel, process. Strategies that are more specific than a vision but 
containing more than a set of initiatives can be implemented either through annual planning, 
or, the more specific they get, through a separate but integrated strategic project process. 
However, these mixed processes, an annual planning process with a more or less formally 
integrated strategic project process, show more implementation problems than the two “purer” 
implementation processes.  
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The empirical findings from the case companies suggest that this is due to these processes’ 
unclear double structures. The structures in the annual planning process are clear and there is 
a considerable amount of experience in using them because the process is repeated in a similar 
way every year, “This process has also been slightly modified almost every year and every 
year you may have a slightly modified template and then the financial organisation brings you 
maybe a new way of presenting those things – but in the big picture it is still quite the same 
and … so, it’s.. standardised but flexible still” (Interviewee, case company B). The structures 
of an entirely separate and parallel strategic initiative process are clearly defined, contain their 
own target setting and bonus system, and the process itself is coordinated with the annual 
planning process, “We need to have sales targets, which are matching up with the top-line 
targets, otherwise the processes would be two different processes and no combined parts 
there. So sales planning needs to be integrated into the budgeting process and the strategy is 
giving the guidelines for both of those ones” (Interviewee, case company D). Structures in 
between are by definition less clear, making cooperation in and coordination of the 
implementation process more difficult. Most pointedly this is shown in case company C 
where strategic projects planning and implementation is integrated into the annual planning 
workflow, “But, that is I think the tricky part; we need to understand what is common, what is 
local and then all those things need to be under the same strategic umbrella”. Strategy is 
implemented in the functions and countries of a division through annual planning, thus, often 
strategic projects might come out of the countries or functions, and sometimes, they need to 
be coordinated across in the form of strategic projects. The lack of existing channels causes 
difficulties to coordinate these projects, “We haven’t had a proper project governance model 
in recent years. And I see that actually as one of the key issues, why it has been so hard to 
implement the strategy or follow up the process”, and a separate, additional channel has been 
constructed, “Now, actually in the current organizational structure we have four main 
common areas that are solution development, operational development, finance and HR. 
Those are the lines going horizontally across the countries. So I think that organizational 
structure, those lines, will give us a tool to coordinate those common development items 
horizontally, across the countries. And that actually is also linked to our project portfolio 
governance that I explained”. However, the informal integration of this corporate project 
management group causes some uncertainty, “But we have been yea, trying to find out what’s 
the right way to govern the whole process or portfolio and it seems that quite complex task to 
get all the people into the same room, have a real discussion about all the projects” in terms 
of cooperation channels, but also roles and responsibilities when projects or processes run 
 93 
 
across the functional activities governed in the annual planning, “And then, to execute the 
strategy you need clear profit-and-loss responsibility (…) persons or management roles. And 
that are in our case the countries, four different countries, and the management heads of these 
countries. So … I guess in a matrix there’s always a kind of conflict between those 
development dotted line responsibility areas and these profit-and-loss responsibility persons. 
But basically, I think you need both, at least in this kind of bigger companies”. The more 
distinct the two processes, operational business through annual planning and strategic projects 
through project management, are defined and formally integrated, the lower these barriers to 
cooperation are.  
Case company D demonstrated an interesting tool in supporting this demarcation and 
integration of the strategic projects-process with the annual planning process; supporting 
software. Supporting software helps in demarcating the process and acts as “physical” support 
that guides the integration of the two processes. The ARC-tool makes work organisation, 
planning, coordination and follow-up easier.  
The fact the position of case companies A and C are not in the same order in the two sub-parts 
of the framework, strategy content (section 5.2: BCAD) and strategy process design (section 
5.3: BACD), does not impact on this framework. In building this framework, case companies 
A and C change their positions between case companies B and D depending on whether 
strategy content (5.2) or strategy process (5.3) are assessed. For strategy content (5.2) the 
order is of relevance because case company C’s strategy is clearly less specific than that of 
case company A, for strategy process (5.3) their order is not of importance, because both 
represent mixed process-types and show very similar strategy implementation problems. 
Changing the position of case companies A and C in 5.3 would only create a disalignment 
along the Annual Planning-Initiative continuum, but not in the problems each process 
encounters and their similarity to the problems of case companies B and D. Therefore, case 
company A’s and C’s strategy implementation processes can be combined under the name 
“mixed processes” in the framework while their strategies remain separate on the top row.   
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6. DISCUSSION 
As a result of the empirical multiple case study, a framework that matches strategy content, 
strategy implementation process design, and strategy implementation problems has been 
developed. This thesis’ contribution to research, its managerial implications and future 
suggestions for research will be discussed. 
 
 
6.1 CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH 
Prior research has presented theories on the various subparts of the strategy implementation 
process (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Burgelman, 1983; Killing et al., 
2005; Morgan et al., 2007; Quinn, 1978). However, the various theories, though clearly 
related, remained fragmented (Noble, 1999). In fact, Noble (1999) posits that “One reason for 
the lack of a cohesive body of existing implementation research may be the diversity of 
perspectives that have been taken in defining the concept” (p.119).  
 
6.1.1. AN INTEGRATION OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
Thus, this master’s thesis contributes to the current body of research in the field of strategic 
management and strategy implementation by providing a coherent overview of the various 
related but unconsolidated theories on the strategy implementation process. The strategy 
implementation process has been described as distinct building block of organisational 
structure (Chandler, 1962) and, based on Li et al.’s (2008) definition, it has been defined by 
its various components; deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), actor 
organisation in terms on their goals pursued, sequencing and role ascription (Floyd & Lane, 
2000) and rigidness and formality, as given by its structural and strategic contexts, 
(Burgelman, 1983). Further, these components, i.e. process qualifiers, have been applied to 
the two common forms of strategy implementation processes, initiative-driven (Killing et al., 
2005; Morgan et al., 2007) and annual planning-driven (Quinn, 1978; Hrebiniak, 2005), 
making evident the conceptual differences between the two. This summary of the literature 
has been used to assess the case companies’ strategy implementation processes. However, this 
summary in itself already presents a contribution to research as it provides a framework, 
solidly grounded in theory, according to which strategy implementation processes can be 
assessed and compared.  
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6.1.2. NEW INSIGHTS INTO STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES 
The empirical study also adds to the understanding of the diversity of strategy implementation 
processes. This diversity is marked by two major distinctions; the perception of goals pursued 
and the process design.  
Existing literature states that often only the “strategic guidelines” according to which 
businesses formulate and implement strategy are given (Hussey, 1999); strategy in these cases 
is a higher-level vision that guides all employees’ every move. Instructions from strategy are 
thus limited, with a wide array of activities being possible and the responsibility of choosing 
the right path lying with the divisions (Hussey, 1999). This thesis has highlighted the value of 
simplicity in these “strategic guidelines”. While earlier work confirmed that strategy needs to 
be well understood throughout the organisation in order for deliberate strategy to occur 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), thus for top management to effectively drive strategy, the value 
of simplicity in the message is not always explicitly referred to.  
Existing literature also states that initiative-driven strategies are more detailed and actions 
more closely linked to tasks (Morgan et al., 2007; Killing et al., 2005). This makes strategy 
highly tangible to these implementers and they can easily link their actions to the strategy 
(Morgan et al., 2007). According to Moore (2009), the closer strategy resembles a set of 
figures, timelines or schedules the more deliberate strategy is. While this reduces room for 
autonomous strategic behaviour, it strengthens corporate control and alignment of strategy. 
Thus, this thesis contributes to the current body of research by showing that vision-driven 
strategy tends to induce emergent strategy, and initiative-driven strategy tends to aim to 
inhibit it.  
Further, this research posits that connecting strategy through actions and cascaded goals to the 
individual-level may actually divide employees’ goals. The findings show that vision-driven 
strategies tend to unite individuals’ personal interests under a common goal, while initiative-
driven strategies tend to divide this common goal, cascading parts of it to the individual. 
Thus, this cascading of goals seems to cause potential resistance to cooperation.  
Concerning the process design, this thesis complements existing literature by comparing two 
common designs; the annual planning-driven process (Hrebiniak, 2005) and the initiative-
driven process (Morgan et al., 2007; Killing et al., 2005). The analysis of their differences 
provides an explanation for why initiative-driven processes are often more obviously 
connected to declared corporate strategy (i.e. intended strategy) than are annual planning-
driven processes; the higher amount of emergent strategy in annual planning-driven 
processes. As emergent strategy will only be officially included in intended strategy after 
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having been implemented, it might appear disconnected to intended strategy at the time of its 
actual implementation. This further proves the stronger corporate control in initiative-driven 
implementation processes as opposed to annual planning-driven implementation processes.  
Hence, this thesis extends Burgelman’s (1983) “Bower-Burgelman process model” by 
showing that there is a relatively tighter configuration of the structural context in initiative-
driven strategy implementation processes than in annual planning-driven processes. 
Interestingly, those cases where an informal combination of the two processes is used, the 
structural context is loosest.  
 
6.1.3. AN UPDATE ON COMMON STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
PROBLEMS AND THEIR STRUCTURAL CONTEXT 
Existing literature on strategy implementation problems (Alexander 1985, 1986; Crittenden & 
Crittenden, 2008; Beer & Eisenstat, 2000; Stirling 2003; Wernhem, 1984; Mankins & Steele, 
2005; Hrebiniak, 2006) has been tested and complemented by an enquiry into the contexts 
within which they appear. The author has established a relationship between certain strategy 
implementation problems with their respective organisational environments. While the prior 
research into strategy implementation problems regards problems mostly as detached from the 
processes within which they occur, this thesis demonstrates that certain types of strategy 
implementation contents and process are associated with certain strategy implementation 
problems. It is further of interest that most problems continue to persist, while some seem to 
have been solved or decreased in importance. This might be due to increased attention paid to 
the issue (Noble, 1999) or changes in the business environment making them obsolete.  
Further, the empirical study provided an insight on the strategy implementation problems 
found in mature, internationally active Finnish industrial companies. As with the findings for 
the discovered strategy implementation processes, also these strategy implementation 
problems discovered in the Finnish context provide new insights to the existing body of 
research on the Finnish companies. Little previous research on strategy implementation 
processes and problems concentrating exclusively on Finnish case companies has been 
conducted. The environmental factor “Finland”, i.e. its cultural, institutional and geographical 
context, does not seem to have an impact on potential strategy implementation processes or 
problems – the observed problems are comparable in nature to the implementation problems 
reported on in the literature review. This indicates that strategy implementation problems are 
universally similar regardless of a company’s environmental factors. 
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6.1.4. A STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS-PROBLEM MATCH 
Resulting from the empirical study, this thesis presents a framework that demonstrates three 
interesting relations between strategy content, strategy implementation processes and strategy 
implementation problems. It adds to prior research on strategy implementation pitfalls by 
taking a different, a novel perspective. Existing theory looks only which are the most common 
strategy implementation problems (Hrebiniak, 2006; Stirling, 2003; Mankins & Steele, 2005) 
or at what kind of promoters and inhibiters to strategy implementation there are (Beer & 
Eisenstat, 2000; Wernhem, 1984). Only Crittenden and Crittenden (2008) and Alexander 
(1991) make an attempt to look at strategy implementation problems with relation to their 
structural environments. Yet, their studies also left room for further enquiry as they do not 
provide a complete framework for the issue. Hence, this work took a different perspective and 
focused on the relationship between perceptions of strategy, strategy implementation process 
design and strategy implementation problems.  
The framework developed in this thesis shows three relations; firstly, a clear relation 
between certain types of strategy content and strategy implementation problems has been 
established. The more vision-like a strategy is, the better cooperation is because all 
employees work for the same shared goal – the company’s vision. However, since 
everything a company does is counted as strategy and emergent strategy is strong, there is a 
risk of missing links between individual actions and the communicated intended strategy. 
The more initiative-driven a strategy is, the better it is cascaded to the individual level 
through individualised tasks, goals and incentives. Implementers understand their role and 
the overall goal is cascaded to the individual. However, this splits a common goal into 
potentially competing individual goals, potentially causing resistance to cooperation.  
Secondly, a clear relation between certain strategy implementation models and 
implementation problems has been established. Annual planning-driven processes tend to 
lack the ability to effectively link actions to communicated intended strategy and the lacking 
formality of a strategy implementation process causes varying implementation quality and 
decreased information flow. Initiative-driven processes have high alignment costs and their 
deliberate character limits autonomous strategic behaviour. Mixed processes lack the clarity 
of the other two types of processes and therefore demonstrate coordination and cooperation 
problems.  
Thirdly, the developed framework contributes to the understanding of how the perception of 
strategy within an organisation is related to this organisation’s strategy implementation 
process. Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) refer to ten “strategy schools”, each of which 
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represents an organisation’s managers’ perspective on the purpose and content of strategy. 
This “perspective” takes an influence on how strategy is made and implemented by shaping 
the organisation’s internal systems and processes. Yet, Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) remain 
on the strategy formation subprocess of strategy work and do not consider the 
implementation subprocess in these ten schools. Furthermore, they do not present a detailed 
model or framework for the strategy implementation process. The framework developed as 
part of this thesis adds to the literature by creating this clear match between perception of 
strategy and strategy implementation process types; the more distinctly strategic action is 
described by intended strategy, the more distinctly it is implemented. Thus, visions are 
implemented through annual planning and initiatives are implemented through a separate but 
parallel strategic initiative processes. There are varying levels of integration between the 
two.   
From this analysis it is evident that the most “pure” processes tend to be least prone to 
implementation problems. Hence, it can be inferred that there is a clear advantage of some 
strategy implementation processes over others; the more extreme processes in terms of 
strategy perception and strategy implementation process are preferential over less clearly 
defined strategy perceptions or implementation processes. 
 
 
6.2 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Companies need to make a conscious choice about their strategy content and implementation 
process types. As can be seen from the developed framework, certain choices in terms of 
strategy content already determine to some extent the strategy implementation process design. 
There needs to be a fit between the chosen strategy content and its implementation mode. In 
general, managers can keep in mind the developed framework’s main message: the more 
distinctly strategic action is described in the intended strategy, the more distinctly it is 
implemented.  
Further, these choices also influence the strategy implementation problems the company is 
likely to meet. Hence, an organisational architect is better able to predict the problems that are 
likely to occur in the strategy implementation process and to prepare for them. The results of 
this study indicate that, if properly executed, purely initiative-driven strategy implementation 
processes produce the least amount of strategy implementation problems. Also purely annual 
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planning-driven implementation processes tend to cause only a limited amount of 
implementation problems. It is the mixed processes, those combining annual planning with 
more or less formalised strategic projects management programs that give way to the most 
and most severe implementation issues.  
In initiative-driven processes, the organisational architect needs to be aware of the strong 
impact of deliberate strategy on future renewal capacity. Alignment of activities is effective in 
achieving the desired results of the intended strategy but might suppress internal renewal 
initiatives that tend to be driven by emergent strategy. In case the organisational architect 
decides to choose this initiative-driven process, he should contemplate ways to otherwise 
elicit ideas from the organisation’s employees. Moreover, alignment costs are considerable if 
two parallel processes need to be organised and maintained – their benefits need to be 
weighed against alignment costs.  
In annual planning-driven processes, the organisational architect should be aware of potential 
problems in linking actions to strategy, in varying implementation quality and in decreased 
information flow. The missing link between the emergent part of strategy implementation and 
intended strategy, as well as the varying implementation quality need to just be acknowledged 
and knowingly accepted, as they are inherent to this process-choice. However, the potentially 
limited information flow can be acted against. One way this could be done by creating a 
formalised information sharing platform and incentivising strategy discussions as part of the 
annual planning. While this would certainly increase the amount of corporate control at 
certain costs, something companies using this form of implementation try to avoid, the 
organisational architect needs to weigh this against the benefits of a freer flow information 
across the organisation. Thus, the organisational architect needs to be aware of these trade-
offs, the existing options and effects, and make an informed decision.  
In mixed processes, a larger amount of problems are likely to occur. The organisational 
architect should first consider opting for either one of the “pure” processes, because their clear 
demarcation provides the least risk for implementation problems. However, if the idea to 
adopt a mixed implementation process persists, the organisational architect should expect any 
of the problems of either one of “pure” processes as well as additional problems related to the 
coordination and cooperation of different organisational members. In order to minimise the 
risk of these additional problems the annual planning process and the strategic project 
management system need to be integrated and designed in a way that enables their 
coordination. Further, each one of the two processes needs to be clearly marked and 
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understood by employees, roles, responsibilities and targets need to be made clear and 
incentives to collaborate across annual planning structures need to be given.  
On a general level, the results of this thesis alert managers to the problems of strategic project 
management. Companies should set stricter criteria for selecting and ending projects, and in 
consequence, execute these criteria more strictly. In all case companies it has been found that 
there are too many projects ongoing. A more detailed prioritisation or stricter selection 
process should be introduced in order to reduce the number of strategic projects from the 
outset. The level of resource scarcity in the respective company obviously has an impact on 
how much more stringent these criteria should be, but in general it appears that there is room 
for improvement in companies. At the end of a project, its termination should be decided upon 
more swiftly and carried out more decisively.  
 
 
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This thesis has demonstrated how strategy content and strategy implementation process 
design are related to each other and how they relate to strategy implementation problems. For 
future research it might be of interest to test the developed theory on a larger scale to verify its 
generalisability. While transferable in nature, the theory in its current state is not generalisable 
because of the small, yet diverse sample of case companies and the unclear question of how 
strongly their particular environments influence on their implementation problems. 
Translating this qualitative study into a larger scale quantitative study could test the theory 
and, if proven to hold true, make it generalisable.  
Furthermore, it might be of interest to look deeper into organisations with two parallel but not 
entirely integrated and demarcated processes in order to refine the framework. The framework 
has been built largely with the help of the two “extreme” cases; one organisation that 
implements strategy as fully integrated into the planning of operational issues through the 
annual planning process, and one organisation that implements strategy through an initiative 
process entirely separated from the annual planning of operational issues. For these “extreme” 
cases there was a clear content-process match and a clear demarcation of the “end points”. 
Case companies between these two extremes show traits and problems from both ends of the 
continuum. Further, they show additional problems related to coordination and cooperation 
because of the lacking integration of the two parallel structures. Going deeper into companies 
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with these unclear parallel structures could show more details on the exact content and 
structure of the problem groups called “coordination” and “cooperation” in the developed 
framework.  
Another interesting approach would be to repeat this study with several case companies that 
map between the two extremes – case companies with two separate processes at varying 
levels of formalisation and integration. This might generate more insight into the differences 
that potentially exist between companies employing both, annual planning and strategic 
initiative processes. It would be interesting to see how these varying degrees of formalisation 
and integration map with their company’s respective strategy content and strategy 
implementation problems.  
Another interesting perspective might be the effect of the company situation on the 
framework. In the empirical findings it has been shown that the purely vision/annual 
planning-driven case company had a stable perception of strategy while the purely initiative-
driven case company considered strategy to be change. Case companies between these 
extreme points along this continuum have no clear stand on whether strategy is change or not. 
Therefore, the sample is too small to see if there is a gradual increase in the notion of change 
from Vision/Annual Planning to Initiative-driven. This gradual increase in the importance of 
change is likely, but the exact impact of the notion of change onto the framework cannot be 
determined from this study. In consequence, it might be of interest to look into the effect that 
change might have on the validity of this framework.  
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8. APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: COMPANY PROFILE OVERVIEW 
 
*2013 figures 
 
 
Company Foundation Industry Organisation Global sales 
Employee 
Count 
Turnover EBIT Public 
A  ~1950 
Building & 
Construction 
Functional 
Head Office: FI 
Sales subsidiaries: 
Japan, D, F 
40% Finland               
60% Global 
       178     48 MEUR  -1.7MEUR 
NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki 
B  ~1900 Food 
Matrix 
Head Office: FI 
Production: FI, 
Russia, Estonia 
Offices: Russia, 
Sweden, Estonia,    
US, China 
60% Finland 
40% Global 
    4.600 2.029MEUR    65MEUR No 
C  ~1900 Food 
Matrix 
Head Office: FI 
Offices: Baltics, 
Sweden, Russia 
47% Finland 
53% Nordics, 
Baltics, RU 
   13.762 1.696MEUR    49MEUR No 
D  ~1950 Capital Goods 
Matrix 
Head Office: FI 
Offices globally  
42% Finland 
58% Global 
   11.000 2.600MEUR   -59MEUR 
NASDAQ OMX 
Helsinki 
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Introduction 
I    Strategy Process Overall 
II  Strategy Implementation Process 
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW QUESTION OUTLINE 
 
 
 
1. Could you please tell me a bit about yourself, i.e. your professional background and experience? 
2. And about COMPANY? 
3. And about your position within COMPANY? 
4. What are your expectations to this study 
a. Fields to be looked into 
b. Results 
 
 
 
5. How is strategy currently perceived in the organisation? 
a. What is the strategy? In max two sentences? 
b. How is it formulated?  Process and People 
c. What is its purpose?  Broad direction - minimal detail 
d. Personnel’s positioning 
 How do the personnel perceive the strategy (clarification = interact + accept)?  
 How do they perceive their role in it? 
 How is the personnel engaged (commitment + competences)? 
6. What does the whole strategy process look like (all phases from analysis, formulation to 
operationalisation, feedback)? 
a. How formalised is the process?  
b. Which phases are there in the overall process? 
 What is their order? 
 How are they interlinked, do they feed back to each other? 
c. What is the importance of each one of these steps?  
 In theory and in practice? 
 
 
7. What does the strategy implementation process look like? 
a. How formalised is the implementation process? Is there an implementation process? 
 Clear ownership / early employee integration? 
 Power of decisions / flexibility at decision points 
 Responsibility and accountability clearly assigned to individuals? 
 Each region/function, how are they coordinated 
b. Which phases are there? Deliberate/Emergent 
c. How are these executed? 
 Order, owner, coordination, execution 
 Monitoring: KPIs and correcting deviations  
 Feedback loop 
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Closing 
d. What are the organisational structures that support each step? 
 HR, remuneration and Incentives 
 Resource allocation 
 Internal politics, power distribution 
8. Are there any problems in any of phases of the implementation process?  
a. Which problems? 
b. What are the reasons for that? 
9. Do you have a solution for this problem? 
a. In practice or just a hypothetical idea on how to solve it? 
 
 
 
 
10. Do you have any other remarks on the topic? 
 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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APPENDIX 3: CASE INTERVIEW DETAILS 
 
Company Interviewee’s role Date Duration Via 
A 1)  VP Baltics 23.4.2014 63min Face-to-face 
 2)  Sales Manager Finland 23.5.2014 52min Skype 
B 1)  VP Marketing &  
      Process Architect 
21.3.2014 59min Face-to-face 
 2)  Marketing Manager 29.4.2014 72min Face-to-face 
 3)  Marketing Coordinator 17.9.2014 53min Face-to-face 
C  1)  VP Business Line 1 &                           
Process Architect 
19.3.2014 69min 
Face-to-face 
 2)  QEHS Manager 23.4.2014 67min Face-to-face 
 3)  Strategy Manager &             
Process Architect 
29.4.2014 88min 
Face-to-face 
D 1)  Strategy Manager &           
Process Architect 
7.8.2014 95min Face-to-face 
 2)  VP Business Unit 1 15.9.2014 71min Lync  
 3)  VP Business Area 1 12.9.2014 49min Lync 
 
All interviews have been conducted in English.  
 
